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Abstract
This thesis examines the difficulties philosophical theories have in adapting to
international issues. This work primarily focuses on the philosophical theory of government
known as “Republicanism”. According to republicanism, the government’s overarching goal is
to promote freedom, which republicans understand as the ability to pursue choices without being
under the arbitrary power of others. After establishing its merits, I lay out the core principles of
republicanism as are most clearly articulated in Phillip Pettit’s work, Republicanism: A Theory of
Freedom and Government. The second chapter then examines how Pettit applies his own view to
analyze the state of Republican freedom in Prime Minister Luis Zapatero’s Spain. Drawing from
his treatment of the Catalonian secession movement, I argue that Pettit seems to overlook certain
crucial international dynamics at play in his analysis. From here, the third chapter applies Pettit’s
framework to analyze the status of the rule of law in Northern Kosovo, where high levels of
distrust and the entrenchment of international actors pose unique problems for Pettit’s
framework. Crucially, the case of Kosovo reveals that the establishment of freedom, in
republican terms, sometimes requires the paternalistic involvement of an international, impartial
actor. Despite its necessity, the sort of interference appears arbitrary and in tension with
republicanism’s core principles. In my view, this tension leaves Republicanism ill-equipped to
adapt to the novel types of dominating relationships that exist in international cases.
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Chapter I: Phillip Pettit’s Republicanism as a Solution to Liberal Democracy’s
“Conflicting Value” Problem
Liberal Democracy’s “Conflicting Value” Problem
Modern political debates are often framed as on the conflicting axes of liberty and
equality, where a shift towards one principle results in a perceived tradeoff on the other.
Consider the contemporary debate surrounding universal healthcare coverage in the United
States. On the one hand, Republicans critique universal health care plans for their infringement
on citizens’ liberty, with New Hampshire State Representative Bill O’Brien calling the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) “as destructive to personal and individual liberties as the Fugitive
1

Slave Act.” Conversely, Democrats like Senator Bernie Sanders ground arguments for universal
healthcare through appeals for equality, claiming that “Americans are entitled to go to the doctor
2

when they're sick and not go bankrupt after staying in the hospital.” Moreover, the debate
around school choice in many American cities is resolved along similar axes. On the one hand,
many people support parents having the ability to choose which public school their children
should attend given they pay taxes and therefore have the right to select the education their child
receives. Conversely, many people oppose school choice given it exacerbates already high levels
of inequality which manifests in underfunded and segregated schools in minority communities.
While policies incrementally change depending on which party is in control, these
debates are unable to be resolved with moral clarity as each debate occurs on fundamentally
different moral axes. Under this view, the gridlock emerges because, reasonably, both parties are
unwilling to make compromises on a fundamental value like freedom and equality. In fact, these
1

“Why Republicans Hate Obamacare,” The Economist (The Economist Newspaper), accessed April 10, 2020,
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2016/12/11/why-republicans-hate-obamacare)
2
“Medicare for All,” berniesanders.com, accessed March 4, 2020, https://berniesanders.com/issues/medicare-for-all/)
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both seem like reasonable, but distinct goals for the state. Thus, the fundamental disagreement
and ensuing gridlock may even seem noble, or virtuous of a true deliberative democratic process.
However, even if these disagreements are sincere, the framing of liberty and equality on
conflicting but equally legitimate moral axes nonetheless tends to create and exacerbate divisions
within society. Indeed, most ideological divides in modern politics are broken down along these
conflicting axes. Importantly, given these policy debates are infused with the moral values of
freedom and inequality— one’s opinion on government policy becomes tantamount with their
morality. Thus, under this system where policy debates are framed to either advance freedom or
equality— disagreements carry significant moral weight and consequences. Instead of
disagreeing over the means, this framework creates the perception between citizens that they are
disagreeing over society’s ends. Crucially, this weakens a democracy’s capacity for
self-governance as it leads to polarization and a diminishing democratic consensus.
While disagreement will likely always exist in democracies, it is important to note that
the state of gridlock and polarization described above is not endemic to liberal democracy.
Rather, it is the result of an intentional choice in how these value clashes are framed. This
chapter therefore aims to provide an alternative solution to democracy’s conflict value problem.
Structurally, this chapter begins by outlining the political philosophy that influences the framing
of modern debates and its role in creating democracy’s conflicting value problem. From there, I
propose Phillip Pettit’s republicanism as an alternative that better manages liberal democracy’s
conflicting value problem.

Ciacci, 8
Understanding Berlin’s “Freedom as Non-Interference” and its Role in Creating Liberal
Democracy’s Conflicting Value Problem
Although examples of the tension between liberty and equality within democracies have
existed for millenia, its framing as an inevitable tradeoff is recent. Indeed, Isaiah Berlin’s 1958
famous lecture on “The Two Concepts of Liberty '' cogently and influentially establishes the
distinction between freedom as non-interference, and other foundational democratic virtues such
as justice and equality. In this work Berlin outlines two mutually exclusive conceptions of
liberty: positive liberty, which defines liberty as self-mastery, and negative liberty, which defines
liberty as non-interference.3 Specifically, Berlin discounts positive conceptions of liberty
primarily out of concerns that it lends itself to authoritarianism. While it can exist at the
individual level, Berlin argues that providing the government the authority to interfere with one’s
life in advancement of some collective good risks abuse by an authoritarian majority. Instead,
Berlin advocates for an account of liberty that is negative, which considers individuals “free to
4

the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with [one’s] activity.” For example,
imagine if my landlord banned me from leaving my apartment, and would physically restrain me
every time I attempted to leave my room. In this case, the landlord actively is interfering with my
freedom of movement, and therefore would clearly violate my negative freedom.
While Berlin concedes that democracies should uphold other foundational values, he
rejects arguments for conceptions of freedom that exceed non-interference. Indeed, he argues
that “individual freedom is not everyone's primary need. For freedom is not the mere absence of
frustration of whatever kind; this would inflate the meaning of the word until it meant too much
3

Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” Four Essays On Liberty, (Oxford,
England: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 118-172.
4
Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” 121.
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or too little.” In turn, Berlin argues that the chief task of Western liberal regimes is to balance
concerns of “glaring inequality or wide spread misery … [by] sacrific[ing] some, or all, of
[one’s] freedom” — resulting in an inevitable tradeoff between values in policy making
6

decisions. Through this framing, Berlin places freedom and alternative values such as justice
and equality on mutually exclusive axes, wherein a regime’s goal is to manage tradeoffs between
these values in implementing policy decisions.
It should now be clear that the aforementioned example of the healthcare debate in the
United States seems to be carried out in Berlinian terms. In fact, support for “Medicare-for-all''
seems to be justified on the grounds of equality, while support for a privatized healthcare system
seems to be rooted in Berlinian claims to freedom as non-interference. As Berlin himself notes,
“it is a confusion of values to say that although my `liberal', individual freedom may go by the
7

board, some other kind of freedom— 'social' or `economic'--is increased.” Indeed, Berlin’s
framework seems responsible for placing each side of the debate at conflicting moral axes due to
his strict conception of freedom as non-interference. Therefore, liberal democracy’s conflicting
value problem largely seems exacerbated by his framework.
Motivation for an Alternative Approach
As noted at the beginning of this Chapter, Berlin’s approach creates divisions in society
that limits a state’s capacity for democratic deliberation. Moreover, Berlin’s approach to
resolving clashing values faces significant practical difficulties. Indeed, quantifying a tradeoff
between equality and freedom seems difficult to empirically implement. Specifically, quantifying
any material loss in freedom, and then evaluating its commensurate payoff for equality, or vice
5

Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” 122.
Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” 123.
7
Ibid.
6
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versa, seems difficult to do on an individual basis, let alone at a societal level wherein different
groups experience these tradeoffs in different magnitudes. Moreover, as freedom and equality are
different in kind for every person and group, one cannot assume a direct transfer from one
group’s freedom to the other’s equality. Reconsider the above healthcare example. According to
a study conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation, the Affordable Care Act benefited
8

minorities significantly more than whites. Conversely, the Affordable Care Act materially
harmed many small business owners and over 5 million Americans who had to pay a tax penalty
9

to keep their private insurance.  Importantly, these groups have different, but powerful, claims to
their respective rights to freedom and equality. On the one hand, minority groups achieving equal
access to healthcare seems like an important and powerful step towards progress. On the other
hand, many Americans conceptualize health benefits as interconnected with their employment,
and decoupling it from employment status will lead to significant economic and social costs.
Indeed, it is unclear which group’s claims should be given preference in government policy.
Moreover, by framing the discussion as a tradeoff between two values, Berlin’s approach hinders
the ability for debates to achieve finality, as working out the empirical tradeoffs are extremely
10

challenging, and individuals could always just agree to disagree about value judgements. As
such, wrestling with these questions through a Berlinian framework seems challenging and
oftentimes hopeless.

8

Samantha Artiga, Kendal Orgera, and Anthony Damico, “Changes in Health Coverage by Race and Ethnicity since
the ACA, 2010-2018,” The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, March 5, 2020,
https://www.kff.org/disparities-policy/issue-brief/changes-in-health-coverage-by-race-and-ethnicity-since-the-aca-2
010-2018/)
9
Jessica Banthin and Paul Jacobs, “The Effects of the Affordable Care Act on Employment-Based Health
Insurance,” Congressional Budget Office, March 15, 2012, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/43090.
10
Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” 122.
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Similarly, Berlin’s negative freedom offers minimal guidance, nor is it a sufficiently
ambitious aspiration for nascent democracies, particularly those that are engaged in post-conflict
reconciliation. Surely, ensuring that all individuals are free from interference is an important
first-step towards creating a democratic polity. Yet, it is unclear that freedom as non-interference
serves as a substantial precondition to inculcate a robust civic culture with a fledgling
democracy. Firstly, as explained below, dejure protection from interference does not go far
enough to protect marginalized and powerless groups. Secondly, even if laws sufficiently
protected an individual’s freedom, they would not be followed without something more
substantial holding society together. Practically speaking, the mere existence of laws preventing
non-interference will not be upheld without some sort of civic fabric pushing individuals to abide
by the laws. In turn, Berlin’s approach yields uncertain results both in its aspirational content and
ability to guide budding democracies.
In response to these criticisms, Berlin could argue that freedom as non-interference
should not be conceptualized as the primary value held in a democratic society, but rather
alongside alternative foundational values in guiding government policy. Indeed, the inclusion of
alternative values such as equality would likely provide fledgling democracies sufficient
aspirational content to guide their democratization, as it would ensure that the dejure
requirements for non-interference are bolstered by societal commitments to equality. However,
even if you accept this argument, it still fails to rectify the core problem in Berlin’s framework—
its difficulty in managing tradeoffs between these values. Despite the existence of alternative
values, Berlin’s approach still seems to struggle to provide its citizenry the conceptual
framework and vocabulary required to resolve many important issues that exist along different
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moral axes. Although tradeoffs are difficult to manage along a single moral value, evaluating a
policy’s ramifications to a single value is likely much clearer than Berlin’s package of values
alternative.
Therefore, I propose Phillip Pettit’s republican theory of government as an alternative
approach. In the next section, I will lay out the core claims of Phillip Pettit’s republican theory of
government and demonstrate that Pettit’s conception of freedom as non-domination succeeds in
simplifying value clashes by framing them along a specific axis, making it a preferred alternative
to Berlin-styled approaches. While certainly imperfect, I contend that Pettit’s republicanism
provides a clearer, richer, and more applicable conception of freedom for fledgling democracies.
Crucially, I argue that these factors make it appear better-suited to apply to real world dynamics
Phillip Pettit’s Republican Alternative: Freedom as Non-domination
Alternatively, Philip Pettit’s republican approach proposes “freedom as non-domination”
as a single, unified, metric that can orient and evaluate governments. In his work,
Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, Phillip Pettit presents freedom as
non-domination as an alternative to freedom as non-interference, which is the primary purpose of
government.11 Similarly to proponents of positive freedom, Pettit argues that freedom of
interference does not sufficiently ensure that individuals are able to act freely. Rather, to be free
in republican terms, one must be free from arbitrary alien control. Crucially, Pettit’s freedom as
non-domination relies on the classification between arbitrary and non-arbitrary forms of
interference to delineate between situations wherein interference and coercion can exist
permissibly in a republican society, and situations where it undermines one’s republican

11

Philip Pettit, Republicanism: a Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
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freedom. Arbitrary interference, Pettit argues, occurs when others “have the power of interfering
with them in an arbitrary way— that is, in a way that they themselves do not control.”12
Importantly, an agent can still exert arbitrary control without actively interfering in another’s
affairs. For example, imagine a case where a restaurant owner, Bob, threatens to withhold pay to
his busboy Dave for a week if Dave takes a day off from work. In this case, Bob may never
follow through on his threat to withhold Dave’s pay, and by extension will never directly
interfere with Dave’s freedom. Nonetheless, the spectre of Bob's interference would certainly
undermine Dave’s ability to act freely.
Conversely, non-arbitrary interference requires active consent and affirmation. Crucially,
Pettit argues that non-arbitrary manner interference can actually strengthen one’s ability to act
freely. For example, consider the image of Ulysses and the Sirens present in Homer's The
Odyssey.13 In this example, Ulyses commands his crew to seal their ears with wax and physically
restrain him to their ship’s mast, enabling him to experience the beauty of the Sirens’ songs
whilst protecting him and his crew from being lured by the Sirens. As is revealed by Ulysses’s
departure from the encounter unscathed, Ulyses’s bondage strengthened his ability to act freely.
Another crucial component of Pettit’s republicanism is the role of the government.
Pettit’s justification for government interference is on similar grounds to the Ulysses case.
Indeed, Pettit argues that government interference is legitimate so long as the people have equal
authority over its administration.Unlike pluralistic value approaches, republican governments are
solely focused ensuring that each citizen possesses the power required to resist the domination
and arbitrary interference of others. Specifically, Pettit defines a person’s power “to include all
J osé Martí and Phillip Pettit, A Political Philosophy in Public Life: Civic Republicanism in Zapateros Spain (New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012), 35.
13
Marti and Pettit, Civic Republicanism in Zapatero’s Spain, 36.
12
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those factors that are liable to affect political, legal, financial and social clout” which enables
them to resist arbitrary interference from others, with the caveat that it is relative, meaning that it
is a function of “the powers at disposal of others” in society.14 Therefore, republican
governments can eliminate arbitrary forms of interference that create domination through
utilizing non-arbitrary laws and policies to increase the power of dominated groups.
Identifying Domination Without Interference
While it is clear how a state can increase the intensity of non-domination for dominated
groups, it is unclear how the state should identify dominating relationships without the presence
of interference. Similarly to the case of Bob, Pettit's account of freedom considers numerous
other instances wherein alien control might be exerted in ways that limit one’s freedom, even
without interference present. Therefore, it is crucial to identify alternative instances of
domination to strengthen our understanding of how domintion can exist without interference in
order to be able to apply it to non-ideal situations. Specifically, this section considers how
domination can exist without interference via intimidation and invigilation. Given these instances
are less intuitive to identify and crucial to the government role in Pettit’s framework, I will
outline an example of each case below.
Domination via Invigilation
To demonstrate how an agent can dominate another without interference, reconsider the
above case of an employer threatening to withhold an employee's pay if they take sick leave. In
the example elaborated above, Dave could restrict Bob’s freedom via “invigilation,” where the
dominating party “economize[s] on interference, resorting to it on a need-for-action basis.”15

14
15

Pettit, Republicanism: a Theory of Freedom and Government, 63-65.
Marti and Pettit, Civic Republicanism in Zapatero’s Spain, 36-37.
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After docking his pay once in response to Bob taking a sick day, Dave is able to restrict Bob’s
freedom by the sheer presence and positionality of “being able to effect” Bob’s employment
status— while in actuality only interfering and penalizing Bob for some of his absences.16
Consequently, the ability for those to dominate others through invigilation demonstrates that
conventional conceptions of freedom as non-interference fall short from encapsulating all threats
to freedom in society.
Domination via Intimidation
In a similar vein, Pettit describes circumstances wherein agents can also dominate others
through intimidation. Reconsider the above case of Bob, the restaurant owner, and Dave, the
waiter— except imagine that Dave is a poor, undocumented worker who does not speak English.
Similarly to the invigilation example, Bob threatens to fire Dave unless he agrees to an hourly
rate well below the minimum wage. Moreover, Bob intentionally lies to Dave, falsely telling him
there are no paths for recourse, as undocument workers are not entitled to free legal counsel nor
protected by labor laws. As Dave does not speak English, he is unable to explain the situation to
outsiders and is ashamed to approach the owner to verify Bob’s claims. Dave eventually decides
that it is not worth securing private counsel for what he believes is an unjust, yet frivolous
lawsuit. Even without the history of interference required in the invigilation case, Dave’s threats
likely would still restrict Bob’s freedom and willingness to take a sick day.
Perhaps most perniciously, Pettit argues that agents may even exercise control without
active interference or the credibility to follow through on their threatened invigilation. In such
cases, although agents “do not have the alleged capacity to interfere that they purport to make

16

Ibid.
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obvious” they “are capable of misleading [one] on those counts: they can make me believe that
they have the alleged capacity and are conducting the associated invigilation.”17 Again, consider
the case of Dave, the waiter— except imagine that Dave leaves Bob’s restaurant after
experiencing the intimidation described above and gets a job at another restaurant managed by
Steve. Unlike at Bob’s restaurant, at the outset of Dave’s employment, Steve makes clear that
Dave is entitled to equitable play and benefits, and provides Dave access to resources in the case
that he ever needs support while working at the restaurant. However, despite these reassurances,
Dave continues to forgo taking sick days or ask for vacation time due to the perception that Steve
is being untruthful, and will behave like Bob and punish him for utilizing any benefits.
Importantly, in this case, the source of Dave’s domination is a false perception based on his prior
experience at Bob’s restaurant, and exists despite Steve’s genuine commitment to refrain from
invigilation or intimidation.
Pettit vs. Berlin
These cases make clear that Pettit's account of freedom as non-interference differs from
Berlin’s notion of freedom as non-interference in many crucial respects. Indeed, Pettit’s
approach adds nuance to Berlin’s treatment of interference as categorically in conflict with one’s
ability to exercise their freedom. As demonstrated in the Ulysses case, non-arbitrary interference
can actually strengthen one’s ability to act freely. Furthermore, the analysis of domination via
intimidation and invigilation demonstrate that domination often exists without active
interference, making them difficult to resolve under Berlin’s framework and highlighting some
of the flaws his approach would have in identifying dynamics in non-ideal contexts.

17

Marti and Pettit, Civic Republicanism in Zapatero’s Spain, 38.
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Furthermore, as seen in the final case, domination that exists without any acts of invigilation or
intimidation are extremely difficult to analyze through a Berlinian lens, due to the fact that they
rely on perceptions, and are derived from power dynamics external to time slice analysis utilized
in Berlinian approaches. Indeed, even if Berlin were to argue that Dave was being interfered with
mentally in his new job, his theory does not possess the adequate tools to unpack how his prior
experience at Bob’s restaurant impacts his current state of domination.
In addition to mitigating liberal democracy’s conflicting value problem, the above cases
of domination without the presence of interference demonstrates Pettit’s framework is
better-suited to consider power dynamics in society. For example, consider the relationship
between the black community and law enforcement in America. While blacks and police officers
are theoretically provided equal protection under the law, both sides certainly do not possess
equally intense non-domination. On the one hand, many members of the black community
perceive police officers as the embodiment of institutional racism, thinking about the countless
murders of unarmed blacks, which manifests in them feeling dominated, afraid, and resentful
towards law enforcement. Conversely, many police officers’ are unable to view black
communities equally due to systemic racial bias, fears of retaliation from black communities, or
guilt which leads them to pity blacks. Furthermore, implementing policies to bolster freedom as
non-interference oftentimes does not create, or even reform, a society to be free from
domination. Indeed, many policies that could theoretically strengthen marginalized groups’
Berlinian freedom, such as contract buying, and the census, further exacerbated their domination
within society. As a result, Pettit’s conception of freedom as non-domination provides a more
salient and applicable alternative to construct a free society.
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Pettit’s Republicanism in Practice
Yet, while Pettit's abstract ideal for a republican state is helpful in identifying
problematic power dynamics in society, it alone is insufficient to guide policymakers to
implement policies that foster non-domination. As such, this paper turns to consider the practical
steps governments can take to reach Pettit’s ideal. In turn, Pettit argues that the “infrastructure of
non-domination” is an important prerequisite for any republican state.18 Specifically, the
infrastructure of non-domination guarantees citizens access to equitable legal and economic
institutions such as a flourishing economy, a reliable rule of law, an inclusive knowledge system,
1920

a sound health system, and a sustainable environment.

Here is an example of a non-dominating infrastructure to consider before turning to
applications of Pettit’s theory. For example, the Skandinavian healthcare system serves as an
exemplar for republican infrastructure against non-domination, as it provides all individuals
excellent healthcare regardless of their financial status. In that system, individuals’ status as
equals is not undermined by the fact that some would not seek medical care due to financial
limitations. Similarly, these institutions provide an important foundation for inculcating an active
civic culture that is equally accessible for all citizens, as non-domination in the public and
private sectors is abated with those structural constraints.

18

Marti and Pettit, A Political Philosophy in Public Life: Civic Republicanism in Zapatero’s Spain, 75.
Ibid.
20
Pettit argues that the environment offers humans sustenance, their place in nature, and their sense of belonging in
life, creating many significant linkages between people and the environment. As a result of this symbiotic
relationship between humans and their environment, wanton destruction of the environment “may affect our
collective chances of survival, our individual prospects of a long and healthy life, or our opportunities for affirming
our connaturality with other species, and for identifying with the planet that we share with them.” Even if the
destruction does not impact the “current representatives of our species in those ways, you may well affect future
generations of human beings, including the future citizens of the society and state that we constitute.” As such, he
argues that environmental destruction constitutes “an assault on at least the range of our undominated choice,” and a
government’s goal should be ensuring that it is sustainable (Pettit Republicanism 137).
19
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In contrast with the above infrastructure of non-domination, informal property rights
systems are an example of dominating infrastructure. Similar to the phenomenon described in
Hernando de Soto Polar’s The Mystery of Capital, economic systems with informal property
rights overwhelmingly penalize marginalized groups and are an example of dominating
economic infrastructure.21 As de Soto recounts, formalized property rights enable individuals to
derive equity from their homes, receive financing due to being able to declare their property as
assets, and effectively develop areas. The lack of these rights therefore demonstrates an
institutional barrier that leads to the domination of the powerless in society.
Looking Ahead: Final Questions Before Turning to Spain
This section aimed to demonstrate that Republicanism’s conception of freedom as
non-domination is a preferable alternative to Berlinian approaches for resolving liberal
democracy’s conflicting value problem. In addition to orienting public debates around one axis,
Pettit’s identification of dominating relationships that exist without active interference seem to
make it preferable for practical applications. Nonetheless, republicanism's application to real
world situations will likely be messy and imperfect.
Despite its success in simplifying liberal democracy’s conflicting value problem to one
axis, republican approaches still must make difficult tradeoffs in prioritizing different group’s
competing claims of non-domination. Indeed, the latter portion of Chapter II largely focuses on
how republican states should navigate such situations. While these tradeoffs are not between
different foundational values like in the Berlin case, they nonetheless are difficult and crucial
determinants of republicanism’s viability in real world situations.

21

Soto, Hernando de, 1941-. The Mystery of Capital : Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere
Else. New York :Basic Books, 2000.
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Chapter II: Republicanism in Practice: Pettit’s Analysis of Zapatero’s Spain
The Spanish Context
Before turning to Zapatero’s Spain, it is important to provide some background on the
various historical factors that have influenced the unique challenges Spain faces in the 21st
century. Indeed, it is important to note that Spanish democracy is rather fragile and naescent, and
its status as a unified nation state is tenuous. In fact, for most of the 20th century, Spain was
ruled by Francisco Franco’s nationalist, authoritarian, and facist regime, and before that it was
predominantly a monarchical state.22 Similarly, perhaps the most important dimension of Spain’s
political context is the unique relationship between its autonomous regions and its central
government in Madrid. Stemming from both its imperial history and el Franquismo, the status of
Spain’s autonomous provinces has consistently been a source of tension in its politics. Thus,
despite Spain’s remarkable democratization, the vestiges of its anti-democratic history still
complicate its politics. Therefore, both its previous anti-democratic governance and regional
pluralism require further examination in order to contextualize Pettit’s analysis.
A Tenuous Peace: Relations between the Federal Government and Autonomous Communities
before Franco (1492-1939)
Unlike many states with imperialist foundations, the cultural, linguistic, and
administrative institutions of conquered territories were permitted to co-exist with the federal
Spanish authority for much of the country’s history. Specifically, instead of creating a unitary,
homogeneous nation-state, the Spanish Crown provided significant autonomy to its conquered
23

territories, oftentimes allowing territories “to retain their prior institutional existence.” As a
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result, with the exception of religion, many autonomous regions in Spain maintained distinct
customs, languages, and norms. In fact, as recognized in the Spanish Constitution, the Basque
Country, Catalonia, and Galicia, are considered “historic nationalities,” which were granted
expedited processes in integration and greater regional autonomy than other provinces due to
24

their long standing presence as a distinct group within Spain. Importantly, prior to Franco’s
rule, these autonomous communities received relatively unprecedented levels of autonomy and
recognition for subnational entities, which entailed having their own distinct languages, customs,
and public services.
Certainly, the relationship between the Spanish Crown and Spain’s autonomous regions
also contained hostility. Beginning in “La Reconquista” when the Castillians dispelled the
Muslim south and throughout its history, the marginalization of groups on the basis of religion
created resentment between the national government and many regional entities. For example,
the southern region of Andalucia experienced decades worth of violence as the central
government forcefully converted its population to Catholicism and rooted out Muslim influence.
Despite Spain’s relatively remarkable preservation of pluralism throughout its history, the
Spanish government’s efforts to forcefully spread Catholicism laid an important foundation for
the hostile relations between the federal government and the autonomous regions in Spain.
Nonetheless, the Crown’s tacit allowance of individuals to practice alternative religions, and
broad federalism largely held the nation together until the ascendance of Francisco Franco in the
early 20th century.
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The Seeds of Discontent: El Franquismo and the Unraveling of Spanish Federalism (1939-1975)
Unlike the Crown’s more lenient approach to pluralism, Franco’s regime exacerbated the
tensions between autonomous regions and the Spanish federal government. Spain’s history under
Franco is consequential to its current political situation for a variety of reasons, predominantly
due to his treatment of marginalized groups and his forceful creation of a homogenous Spanish
identity, which was Catholic, Castilian-speaking, and federalist. In addition to further oppressing
religious minorities, Franco’s government expanded those on society’s margins to include entire
regions and economic classes of people. Specifically, Franco’s regime persecuted any person or
group whose existence conflicted with his new vision of the Spanish national identity. Indeed,
during the Spanish Civil War and the first nine years of Franco’s rule, dubbed by historians as
the “White Terror,” Franco’s government killed, raped, and brutalized over 500,000 members in
25

opposition groups, many of whom were members of Catalonian and Basue nationalist groups.
In addition to acts of violence, Franco revoked the autonomous status of Spain’s subregions,

banned the instruction and use of languages besides Castillian, and censored any cultural activity
26

or media that exceeded his vision of Spanish identity. Furthermore, Franco’s regime utilized
the Catholic church to exert cultural pressure to comply with his edicts, imposing severe social
costs on groups that did not mold into Franco’s vision for Spain.
In addition to these direct attempts at marginalization, the Franco administration’s
corruption and nepotism exacerbated economic disparities between regions in Spain. Under
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Franco’s regime, resources were dispensed arbitrarily and on a whim, without any structural
mechanism for distribution. As a result, regions that complied with Franco’s nationalist agenda,
and those which were historically economically prosperous received more resources, while
regions that resisted his authority were left behind.
In response to Franco’s policies, many opposition groups formed which would become
influential in modern Spanish politics. Most notably, both violent and nonviolent regional
separatists groups gained popularity due to Franco’s persecutory policies. From proto-socialist,
pro-union advocacy organizations, to the Basque armed seperatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
(ETA), many organizations that would influence Spain’s ensuing democratization formed in
response to life under Franco’s rule. Therefore, when Franco’s regime collapsed after his death
in 1975, and Spain’s King Juan Carlos voluntarily ceded his power to a civilian government, the
provisional government’s primary task was bringing such disaffected groups back into the fold to
create a unified democratic polity.
Steps Towards Normalizing Relations: Spain’s Democratization to Zapatero’s Inauguration
(1975-2004)
In turn, Spain’s constitution and initial Prime Ministers took important steps in allaying
the divisions stoked under Franco’s rule. As mentioned previously, the Constitution provided
greater autonomy for regional governments, and codified a robust, and equitable rule of law for
all citizens regardless of their economic, political, or social status. However, despite the success
of the constitution and previous governments, the vestiges of el Franquismo and its imperial
history continue to complicate Zapatero’s Spain. Specifically, due to the lack of equitable
development during Francoist Spain, poorer areas of Spain are not financially self-sufficient, and
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more affluent areas such as Catalonia complain that they are not a part of a fair economic
arrangement. Furthermore, violent sepratist groups like the Basque Country’s ETA remain active
and unsatisfied with the post-constitutional order. Indeed, while historically marginalized groups
such as Basques continue to face injustice in the federal system, historically dominating groups
such as the Catholic Church retain unfair advantages in society.
Pettit’s Republican Analysis of Zapatero’s Spain
Within this rich historical context, Pettit’s A Political Philosophy in Public Life identifies
how some of the more abstract Republican ideals operate in the case of José Luis Rodríguez
Zapatero’s Spain. Structurally, Pettit methodologically breaks down his analysis of Zapatero’s
governance by outlining the republican principles Zapatero espouses, then analyzing their
effectiveness at guarding against private and public domination. The first principle Zapatero
emphasizes is that of civicism, which through “empowered citizenship” aims to create “a civic
27

body that rules itself.” Indeed, Zapatero’s civicism is a crucial prerequisite for ensuring that
government interference is conducted in a non-arbitrary manner. Similarly, the second principle
Zapatero has endorsed repeatedly is the espousal of freedom as non-domination as the ultimate
form of government. In the following section, I will recapitulate Pettit’s analysis of the Zapatero
administration’s success in upholding those principles to limit private and public domination.
From Republican Principles to Institutional Design: The Infrastructure of Non-domination
As we saw in the first chapter, Pettit argues that robust infrastructures of non-domination
are crucial for the existence of freedom of non-domination in society. Specifically, Pettit
identifies six key elements of a nation’s public and private institutions which ensure that
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individuals are free from domination. In the private sphere, Pettit identifies a flourishing
economy, a reliable rule of law, and an inclusive knowledge system to be paramount. In the
28

public sphere, Pettit argues that transparency, accountability, and responsiveness. However,
similarly to my criticism levied against Berlinain approaches in post-conflict situations, the strict
existence of the aforementioned infrastructure is insufficient to ensure that citizens enjoy equally
intense non-domination. In addition to the baseline of promoting an infrastructure of
non-domination, republican governments must also empower the disadvantaged and restrain the
strong. As Pettit notes, “unless the government does something to rectify … inequalities of
29

advantage and power, the weaker will not be able to stand tall with the stronger.” Nonetheless,
I contend that it is helpful to first consider whether a state’s institutions cultivate freedom as
non-domination, then analyze how the government girdles those institutions to ensure citizens
can enjoy them with equal intensity. Therefore, in the following section, I will first briefly
outline the importance of each element in preventing private domination and its corollary in
Zapatero’s Spain, before turning to more complex cases where Zapatero’s governments must
make difficult tradeoffs to ensure the freedom of non-domination it cultivates is enjoyed with
equal intensity by all citizens.
Guarding Against Private Power
A Flourishing Economy
As significant poverty severely inhibits an individual’s ability to resist domination, Pettit
argues that a flourishing economy is crucial for any repubican state. While strict material
equality is not compulsory for a republican government, the economy must be sufficiently robust
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and inclusive to prevent private domination. Indeed, it is easy to imagine how either an exclusive
economy, or one that is stagnant, is positioned for private domination. As seen in Francoist
Spain, preventing unionization and wealth creation outside of the government sponsored labor
syndicate left a majority of the population economically, and politically, powerless. Therefore,
Pettit first focuses on the health of the economy under Prime Minister Zapatero’s administration
in his analysis.
From an economic perspective, Pettit argues that general positive trends in GDP growth
and employment rates indicate that Zapatero’s government has been reasonably successful in
promoting a flourishing economy. However, there are certain economic metrics where
Zapatero’s government has been less successful. Specifically, Pettit notes that a significant
long-term concern is “the low level of research and development and the comparatively low level
30

of productivity” in Spain’s economy. Indeed, a lack of research and development and low
productivity levels cast doubt on the ability of Spain’s economy to innovate and create future
jobs. Nonetheless, Pettit commended the Zapatero administration for implementing policies that
have led to widespread growth such as increasing investment into research and development. For
example, Pettit references the Zapatero administration’s commitment to increase research and
development spending by 125% and pledge to increase its percentage of that funding to lotteries
31

for research grants as positive steps to cultivating a flourishing economy. However, this metric
of analysis could be strengthened by analyzing how that growth is distributed along demographic
lines. As one of the metrics of a republican society is empowering the disadvantaged, legislation
and legal protections for disabled groups to eradicate de jure barriers is insufficient. In turn,
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Pettit’s analysis of economic mobility for society at large should also consider that such growth
is distributed equitably.
A Reliable Rule of Law
Secondly, Pettit argues that a crucial component in a republican society is a reliable rule
of law. As mentioned earlier, the 24th amendment in the Spanish constitution provides “every
person ... the right to obtain the effective protection of the Judges and the Courts in the exercise
32

of his or her legitimate rights and interests, and in no case may he go undefended.” As any
other Republican regime, this provision enables individuals to receive legal services and equal
protection in front of the law, regardless of their financial circumstances. Nonetheless, Pettit
identifies both formal and practical limitations that prevent Spain from achieving that ideal For
example, before the Zapatero administration, there was not specific legislation to prevent
domestic violence, nor legislation pertaining to those with disabilities and their caretakers.
Despite general de jure equality in the eyes of the law, the lack of specific measures for legal
recourse for marginalized groups prevented them from enjoying equally intense non-domination
in society. In response to these problems, Zapatero’s government passed sweeping legislation to
legally empower the disadvantaged. Specifically, the Zapatero administration passed The Law of
Homosexual Marriage to enable same sex couples the same marital rights as heterosexual
33

couples. Moreover, his administration passed The Law against Gender Violence and The Law
of Dependency to strengthen the standing of domestic violence victims and those with
disabilities.
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Furthermore, Zapatero responded to many practical limitations that hindered the
reliability of Spain’s legal system. In addition to codifying protections for marginalized groups,
the Zapatero administration took proactive measures to combat systemic inequalities that extend
beyond the law in Spanish society. Most notably, Zapatero’s administration passed The Law of
Equality, which aims to eliminate systemic sexism and promote gender equality through obliging
“political parties to have at least 40% women on their electoral lists… [and requiring] companies
employing more than 250 people to introduce equality plans aimed at eliminating discrimination
35

against women in pay, promotion, and benefits.” Indeed, this unprecedented legislation
demonstrates an important first step in practically empowering the powerless in Spanish society.
Beyond de jure protection in the eyes of the law, The Law of Equality strives to provide women
de facto power and equal recognition in society.
An Inclusive Knowledge System
Thirdly, Pettit argues that an inclusive knowledge system is essential for providing
individuals the resources to engage in robust republican self-government. Indeed, Pettit argues
that it “essential for the widespread enjoyment of non-domination that citizens understands and
are informed about their society and polity, having the know-how required for a full, engaged
36

life.” Unlike the aforementioned levels of analysis, Pettit notes that Spain’s educational system
still faces significant challenges. For example, according to a 2004 study by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “30% of students in Spain dropped out of
secondary education, against an OECD average of 12%; and Spain’s public spending was
37

twenty-eighth out of thirty countries.” While the Zapatero administration inherited a flawed
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educational system, Pettit notes that recent legislation leaves room for optimism. In response to
this crisis, the Zapatero government has implemented education reform to reduce administrative
waste and decrease truancy, as well as pledged to increase education funding. Perhaps most
significantly, Pettit lauds the Zapatero administration’s introduction of civic education courses
throughout the nation, through which “children will be introduced to the issues of government in
a pluralist society, to the different viewpoints on those issues, and to the means whereby they can
be resolved in democratic dialogue without secularist belligerent or religious righteousness.”38 In
fact, implementing such civic education courses is an important first-step in cultivating a society
that is practically capable of engaging in robust, repubican self-governance.
Guarding Against Public Power
On the flip side, Pettit argues that accountability, transparency, and responsiveness are
crucial elements of Republican governments. As mentioned in the introduction, Pettit’s
republicanism also strives to guard against public domination, specifically through ensuring that
governments are transparent, accountable, and responsive. Structurally, Pettit argues that the first
step in preventing public domination is through a mixed constitution, wherein the powers of
government are separated and diffuse throughout the citizens in society. Indeed, the “officials
and bodies [empowered in a mixed constitution] constrain one another so that any legislation or
policy that passed challenges on all sides would be more or less bound to reflect what was
39

thought of as the common good.” On that count, Pettit argues that Spain scores relatively well
as a parliamentary government with ample separation of powers, protections for individual
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rights, and electoral integrity. Furthermore, Pettit argues that Zapatero’s administration took
additional steps to guard against public domination.
Government Responsiveness
In order to strengthen the Spanish government’s responsiveness, Zapatero made efforts to
reform Spain’s campaign finance system. As Pettit notes, Spain’s campaign finance laws enable
special interests groups to amass overwhelming influence over policy, leading those interests to
dominate those of other groups. In response to these concerns, Pettit lauds Zapatero’s efforts to
establish a limit for campaign finance contributions. This policy ensures that no individual can
have disproportionate influence over the political process, and strengthens the government’s
ability to be responsive to its citizens.
Government Transparency
To increase government transparency, Zapatero’s government took bold action by
banning federal funds being spent on party propaganda. Previously, the government was
permitted to spend public funds on advocacy campaigns that acted as party propaganda for
reelection. In response to this, Zapatero’s government passed the “law of institutional publicity,”
which restricts government spending on propaganda, and only allows expenditure on “clear
40

matters of public interest and utility.” Similarly, Pettit lauds the Zapatero administration’s
efforts to strengthen the independence of the national television station. Specifically, Zapatero’s
government ensured that the national television broadcaster (RTVE) is independent and
autonomous of both private and public influence by making it appointed by ⅔ of parliament, and
empowering that body to select its director general.41 As Pettit notes, this provides the
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substantive benefits of having an impartial commenter on the government’s behavior without
private biases, but also provides the polity symbolic benefits by demonstrating that the party in
power is not a dictatorship— and provides the public the maximum resources to monitor
42

government affairs.

Government Accountability
Regarding accountability, a central political cleavage contextualizing Zapatero’s
administration was the previous government’s decision to enter the Iraq War, despite low public
approval and protests against the action. In order to prevent future governments from behaving
similarly, Zapatero’s government worked to ensure that the powers of the central government,
specifically its war powers, were more accountable to the public. In that vein, Zapatero’s
government introduced a law “whereby parliament is required to approve the sending of Spanish
43

troops on active duty abroad.” Acts like these work to strengthen the government’s
transparency, accountability, and responsiveness in accordance with Pettit’s republican ideal.
The Ultimate Test: Republican Guidance for Balancing the State’s Competing Obligations
While providing substantive guidance in certain areas, many could contend that, up to
this point, Pettit’s analysis of Zapatero's Spain tends to avoid instances where the state must
balance the non-domination of multiple stakeholders in crafting policy. Although providing an
important baseline, Zapatero’s laudable efforts to pass legislation providing legal recourse for
domestic violence victims is largely uncontroversial in these terms, as it almost universally
strengthens the intensity of non-domination for all Spaniards. However, the situation would look
quite different if a policy were to strengthen one group's non-domination at the cost of another
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group’s. Indeed, is important to note that this is an important challenge republicanism faces more
broadly. As I noted at the end of Chapter I, while simplifying political disputes by framing them
along one moral axis— freedom as non-domination— republicanism brings with it a familiar
problem; namely, how the state should evaluate and prioritize competing claims of domination
by constituent groups. Indeed, government remedies for domination cannot always universally
increase all citizens' intensity of non-domination. In fact, in many instances the government is
required to make difficult tradeoffs between regions, NGOs, and the broad populus to ensure that
they all can experience non-domination with equal intensity.
Fortunately, Zapatero's relationship with the Catholic Church, the ETA seperatist group,
and the Catalonian regional government provides guidance for how a state should wrestle with
its competing obligations to different groups under a republican framework. These specific cases
serve as important examples of how to apply republican values beyond isolated cases, to more
complex dynamics, where the non-domination of many stakeholders must be taken into account
in creating policy solutions to cultivate freedom as non-domination for all citizens. In analyzing
these cases, I will first lay out the competing claims of non-domination that could be made by
different groups in republican terms, then demonstrate how these different claims reasonably
lead to divergent policy prescriptions for the Spanish government. In managing relations with the
Catholic Church, Zapatero’s administration must balance the competing considerations of the
faith community and the general population. In evaluating whether to negotiate with ETA,
Zapatero’s government must reconcile the Basque country’s claims for greater autonomy with its
obligation to protect the Spanish citizenry from acts of violence. Finally, in response to the
Catalonian independence movement, the Spanish government must manage its obligations to

Ciacci, 33
respect Catalonian self-determination with its duty to preserve the integrity of the Spanish
federal state.
Similarly to Berlin’s approach to conflicting values, it is important to recognize that
solutions in these cases are not black and white. Indeed, as Pettit moves from the case of the
Catholic Church to Catalonian secession, it becomes increasingly difficult to manage the
tradeoffs between stakeholders, and the compromises reached are often imperfect in republican
terms. While imperfect, through delving into Zapatero’s response to these three crises, Pettit
demonstrates that the republican conception of freedom as non-domination provides strong
guidance nonetheless for complex real world dynamics.
Case Study #1: The Spanish Government’s Relationship with The Catholic Church
The first case that exhibits the state wrestling with competing claims of non-domination
is seen in Zapatero’s Spain treatment of the Catholic Church. In this case, Zapatero’s government
must balance its obligations to prevent the Catholic faith community from domination with its
obligations to prevent the general population from being dominated by a state recognized
religion. To briefly recapitulate, Catholicism has been Spain’s primary religion through its
imperial history and el Franquismo, resulting in the Catholic Church’s widespread influence in
Spanish society. Moreover, the Church’s significant influence has manifested through nearly
Spain’s population being overwhelmingly Catholic. As a result, there is significant debate
surrounding the extent to which the state should recognize Catholicism’s long-standing influence
in Spain’s culture and national identity through granting the Church special privileges such as
federal funding and tax benefits.
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Understanding the Competing Claims of Domination
There are two primary arguments Catholics could marshal for the Church being granted
special treatment in society. Firstly, as a majority, Catholics could argue that the state has an
obligation to provide an institution enjoyed by a majority of its population with special
recognition. Secondly, and more persuasively, the Catholic community in Spain could argue that
the Church’s central role in forming Spain’s culture and national identity makes it more than
simply a religious institution, but rather one that provides distinct and valuable social and
cultural goods. In addition to providing services for the practicing Catholic faith community,
Catholics could argue that the church provides tangible assistance through providing counseling
and assistance to the needy, and serves as a moral foundation for secular Spaniards. Following
that logic, Catholics could argue that funding the Catholic church also benefits non-Catholics and
ought to be considered the same as funding a national endowment of the arts, for instance, given
the Church produces significant culture and social goods that contribute to Spain’s broader
national identity. Indeed, supporters of the church could argue that without federal funding and
recognition, the Church would likely have to reduce the quantity and quality of its services,
adversely impacting its followers and Spanish culture as a whole. In addition to the material
costs for Catholics and non-Catholics, they could argue that the declining influence of the
Catholic Church could increase domination in society, as many of its cultural ramifications on
civic life in Spain would disappear. For these reasons, the Catholic Church and its followers have
reasonable claims to argue that the state is obligated to provide the Catholic Church federal
funding to prevent from being dominated. While many instinctively balk at the idea of providing
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the Catholic Church formal privileges, it is important to first consider how the Catholic Church
could make a republican claim for federal support.
On the other hand, republican arguments against providing special recognition for the
Catholic Church, even if democratically legitimated, are rooted in its potential to dominate
marginalized groups and corrode its political institutions. Throughout Spain’s history, the
dangers of elevating Catholicism to a privileged position in society are well documented. Indeed,
publically sanctioning any religious group coerces individuals to conform to the faith and erects
social costs for non-believers— both of which restrict freedom as non-domination of
non-believers. As seen in the Spanish Inquisition, it is easy to see how the state forcefully
mandating its populus to conform to one religion causes domination. However, the state need not
forcefully ensure compliance to dominate non-believers, simply the existence of a publicly
endorsed religion threatens non-believers' freedom as non-domination. To illustrate this point,
imagine living in a society which provides its citizens the freedom to practice whatever religion
they’d like, whilst also allowing a specific religion to be taught in public schools. In order to
recille its commitments to the specific religion and religious freedom broadly, the state allows
students to opt-out of class sessions in which the religion is being taught. Initially, one may
consider this arrangement equitable under a republican framework, as those who do not practice
the sponsored religion are seemingly permitted to do so freely. Yet, despite not explicitly
targeting non-believers, this arrangement is clearly problematic in republican terms under further
examination. As Cass Sunstein notes in his work Nudge, psychological studies consistently find
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that defaults in choice architectures are likely to be conformed to be members of society, and
those that diverge from this shared societal trait are likely to experience marginalization.44
Secondly, the Catholic Church's retainment of special privileges and funding poses
45

significant harm to Spain’s democratic process. Specifically, despite assurances in the
Constitution that the church would begin self-financing after six years, Pettit notes that the
church “continued to obtain massive state subsidies; these have been provided, presumably, for
fear that the church would mobilize opposition to any party that did not continue to provide
46

financial support.”

In turn, as the current arrangement requires the citizenry to fund a specific

religious organization, republicans could argue that this relationship dominates those in the
minority who are not Catholic to fund an institution that they do not believe in. Secondly, the
church’s special status in Spain strengthens its ability to pressure politicians, limiting the
government’s ability to be responsive to the needs of all citizens. Indeed, precisely this sort of
preferential treatment allows the Catholic church to dominate citizens and effectively eliminate
other religious and social organizations from establishing themselves in Spain.
Pettit’s Guidance and Zapatero’s Response
As demonstrated above, Zapatero’s administration is forced to reconcile its obligation to
support the Catholic Church and its followers’ identity and freedom of association with its
obligation to non-believers and the integrity of its political institutions. Upon first glance, it is
clear that the state’s republican obligations to marginalized groups and the populus supersede its
commitment to the Catholic Church. While refusing to fund the church certainly poses financial
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disadvantages, private individuals would still be permitted to fund the church and voice their
Catholic ideals publically. In exchange for that disadvantage, non-believers’ intensity of
non-domination is strengthened and Spain’s political institutions are freer from the Church’s
grasp.
Nonetheless, some members of the Catholic Church would likely be frustrated with this
conclusion. In these instances when a group and the government conflict over a policy due to its
divergent implications on the group’s self-interest and the societal communal good, Pettit argues
that if “the judgement is made according to their ideas about proper procedures and that it is
dictated, ultimately, by an interest that they share with others” they will ultimately understand
47

and support the decision. Moreover, he continues, “they may bitterly regret the fact that the
judgement disadvantages them, but under the assurance described they can look on that
disadvantage as a misfortune on a par with a natural accident; they don’t have to see it as a token
48

of domination by the state or by other groups within the state.” This sort of concession is seen
in the Catholic Church’s case. While the government’s refrain from publicly endorsing a religion
would personally disadvantage Catholics, Pettit contends that they would nonetheless accept the
policy given it was determined through a process they deem legitimate. Indeed, Pettit argues that
their personal sacrifice would come palatable in exchange for the communal increase in freedom
as non-domination afforded to all Spaniards, by preventing religions from having special
influence over public life.
While noting that the relationship between the church and the federal government
remains imperfect, Pettit identifies numerous policies that the Zapatero administration took to
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make their arrangement more equitable. Specifically, the government will no longer serve as a
backstop if the church’s yearly expenditures exceed their yearly revenues. Moreover, Pettit
commends the Zapatero administration for “reach[ing an accomodation with the church over the
49

teaching of religion in schools.” Together, these policies aim to restrict the Church’s influence
over Spanish society. However, this progress has come at a notable cost. In exchange for the
Church’s acceptance of these reforms, the Spanish government agreed to increase the amount an
individual can earmark for the Catholic church in their taxes by 0.5%, with the caveat that church
50

publicizes its yearly expenditures. While many would likely object to the fact that any tax
dollars go to a religious institution, the proviso requiring transparency at least strengthens the
public’s accountability over church spending.
Key Takeaways
This compromise is important for two reasons. Firstly, it demonstrates that
republicanism, for all of its reliance on civic engagement and direct democracy, often requires
caution towards populist and majoritarian impulses. Indeed, this case demonstrates that
regardless of the fact that the Catholic Church’s objections were voiced through legitimate
republican mechanisms, the basis of all claims are not equal. Secondly, and more importantly, it
demonstrates that historical contexts often entrench time slice analyses of clashing values—
requiring in-depth historical analyses and imperfect trade-offs to rectify dominating
relationships. This works both ways. Despite its republican legitimacy as a voluntary association,
the Catholic Church’s role in both directly and indirectly marginalized minority groups and
undermining Spanish democracy prevents it from supercedeing the state’s obligation to all its
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citizens. Yet, at the same time, its ubiquity in Spanish society makes it impossible to simply
discard— resulting in the compromise reached by Zapatero’s government.
Case Study #2: The Spanish Government’s Relationship with ETA
The Zapatero administration’s treatment of the Basque seperatist group ETA provides
further guidance for how the state should resolve competing republican obligations. However,
this second example turns out to be more challenging for Pettit given the state must reconcile
obligations levied by two public groups: the Basques and the general Spanish populus.
However, it differs in that both obligations are being levied by public groups, with equally valid
republican bases for contestation.
Understanding the Competing Claims of Domination
On the one hand, above all, the government has the clear republican obligation to protect
its citizenry from extrajudicial acts of violence. However, on the other hand, the government has
the duty to hear ETA’s grievances and ensure that they are not being dominated by the Spanish
government. Indeed, it is important to note that ETA and the Basque People have been
persecuted throughout Spain’s history, and that it was originally subsumed into the Spanish
polity by force resulting in long-standing resentment. Moreover, although many Basque people
may disapprove of their violent means, many of ETA’s grievances against federal domination are
echoed by its regional population. Thus, while the state’s obligation to protect its citizenry is
paramount, it is important to not discredit the broader movement underpinning ETA’s actions.
Pettit’s Guidance and Zapatero’s Response
That being said, it would be a mistake to classify these competing claims as equally
compelling. Despite equally legitimate grievances, the violent method through which ETA acts
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upon their agenda lowers its merit as a republican claim for two reasons. Firstly, as a republican
state’s primary goal is to protect its citizens— ETA’s violent acts ensure that their message,
however valid, is secondary to the state’s obligation to prevent harm. Moreover, granting ETA’s
demands would not necessarily ensure that the violence would subside. Indeed, according to
Pettit, republican rule of law requires that the transgressor recognizes their crime, provides
51

reparations for the victims, and gives reassurance that the transgression will not happen again.

While hypothetically a peace settlement could include recognition and reparations at the time of
signing, the time inconsistency problem prevents the state from being assured that ETA would
not act violently again if further demands were not met. Secondly, ETA’s decision to catalyze
political change outside the republican mechanism of engagement in the democratic process
undermines Spain’s republican institutions. Indeed, launching terrorist attacks on civilians both
polarizes the general surrounding the issue and erects barriers to republican discourse.
Furthermore, if those violent acts occur without reprieve, they will incentivize other groups to do
the same to catalyze change, resulting in stunning blows to the state’s republican institutions. As
seen in the case of the Catholic Church, the government's choice to prioritize the rule of law and
protect the citizenry also strengthens all citizens’ freedom from violence— even those in the
Basque country from acts of retaliation.
As such, Pettit commends the Zapatero administration for balancing ETA’s concerns for
greater autonomy and historical injustice with the safety of its populus through holding a series
of negotiations with the group. Although Zapatero’s government could not yield to ETA’s
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violence with concessions without undermining the rule of law, it still fulfilled its republican
duty of engaging in dialogue with a concerned republican subregion.
Key Takeaways
This case demonstrates another important consideration for states evaluating competing
republican claims: the manner through which they are articulated. Unlike the previous case of the
Catholic Church, the content of ETA’s grievances are equally valid in republican terms.
However, unlike the Church cases where the contestation was voiced through democratic
institutions and processes, ETA’s use of violence to communicate its grievances made its
grievances subservient to the state’s competing obligation to protect the citizenry.
Case Study #3: The Spanish Government’s Relationship to Catalonia
Finally, the status of Catalonia presents the most complex challenge for Pettit’s
republicanism present in Zapatero’s Spain. Unlike the case of the ETA, the Catalonian secession
movement has largely refrained from acts of violence and voiced their grievances through
democratic instruments. Additionally, unlike the case of the Catholic Church, it is difficult to
discern whether the Catalonian secession movement or Spanish Unionists have a stronger
republican basis for accusing the other of domination. Moreover, this case differs in that both
sides have a fundamentally different conception of the common interests— making the
republican claims of Catalonian secessionists and the spanish government equal in kind.
Understanding the Competing Claims of Domination
In this case, Spain’s federal government must reconcile its obligation to those living in
Catalonia with its broader obligation to Spain’s less developed regions. Economically,
Catalonian secessionists argue that they put out more than they receive in taxes and are being
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compelled to financially support the rest of Spain. Culturally, Catalonian nationalists argue their
unique language, culture, and history inhibits integration into the Spanish state and makes the
region better-suited to be an independent country.
Conversely, Spanish Unionists contend that Catalan’s departure would pose significant
harm to lesser developed regions that rely on public services financed by its economic output.
Moreover, Spanish Unionists argue that Catalan’s current high economic productivity results
from significant investment by the Spanish federal government such as the government’s
investment plan in anticipation of the 1992 Olympic Games in Barcelona.52 In response to
Catalan’s cultural objections, Spanish Unionists argue that Catalan’s unique identity fits well
within Spain’s multicultural framework, and that providing further autonomy risks a
balkanization that endangers the entire Spanish polity. The argument against Balkanization is
one of the more powerful and effective arguments levied by Spanish Unionists. Referencing the
dissolution of Yugoslavia in the late 1990s, Spanish Unionists argue that increasing the
autonomy of regions like Catalonia risks a similar balkanization of Spain. As numerous
semi-autonomous regions exist in Spain, they contend that increasing autonomy in Catalonia
could catalyze many other regions in Spain to call for similar accomodations— ultimately
leading to the dissolution of Spain. Importantly, this dissolution would yield substantive harms to
Spain’s lesser developed regions that are not self-sustaining, which require the economic output
of regions like Catalonia to subsist. Moreover, Spanish Unionists argue that balkanization would
diminish the state’s capacity to provide crucial public goods such as the national defense— given
the state could no longer rely on the resources of seceded regions.
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Pettit’s Guidance and Zapatero’s Response
Fortunately, in these instances where there is strong disagreement surrounding the
common interests of the state, Pettit’s republicanism provides guidance. While acknowledging
that these intense moments of disagreements can lead towards secession, Pettit argues that there
are a variety of ways “to boost the freedom as non-domination of radical dissenters” before
53

resorting to secession. Specifically, Pettit argues that on the basis of this “conscientious
procedural objection,” a republican society can provide for “dissenting individuals and groups to
claim special treatment under the law” solong as that “special treatment does not create the
54

possibility of some individuals exploiting others.” The case of Catalonia is one of those cases—
wherein a subgroup’s vision of the common good clashes with the state’s— and conscientious
procedural objection is the primary tool through which the parties’ different conceptions can be
reconciled under Pettit’s framework. As stated previously, Spain’s recognition of Catalonia as
one of the three historical nationalities entitled to expedited integration in its constitution
demonstrates that conciouscientous procedural objection has historically been used to
accommodate Catalonian sentiments. While an important first step, the persistence of the
disagreement between Catalonia and the Spanish government regarding the polity’s common
interest illustrates that they desire more than simply special privileges.
In turn, Pettit lauds Zapatero for providing greater regional autonomy to Catalonia while
ensuring that incentives remain in place to keep it integrated within the Spanish Federal system.
Specifically, Zapatero’s government provided Catalonia and other autonomous communities
greater authority over the administration of public services, empowering them to craft their own
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curriculums and conduct classes in local dialects. Pettit justifies his support for Zapatero’s
empowerment of regional communities through appealing to the doctrine of separation of
powers, arguing that “if a community is governed in some areas by two centers of power, with
different forums of accountability, then the chance increases that no one will be dominated by
government decisions; special factional or sectional interests will balance and help check one
55

another.” As such, Pettit argues that Zapatero’s efforts strengthen the intensity of
non-domination for Catalonians through decentralizing authority which restrains each source of
government’s ability to dominate another.
Key Takeaways
While supporting greater decentralization in Spain, Pettit concedes that measures must
also be taken to preserve the cohesion of the unified Spanish state. Indeed, there are practical
concerns that arise if certain sections are allowed to secede without a legitimate republican basis.
As noted above, many unionists argue that providing greater autonomy for Catalonia risks
“Balkanizing” Spain, wherein the precedent would motivate other autonomous communities to
seek similar accomodations leading to the unravelling of the Spanish state. In response to these
concerns, Pettit argues that it is incorrect to assume that greater regional autonomy would
necessarily lead to secession, and that forcefully compelling states to remain within a union is the
antithesis to republican freedom. Indeed, Pettit recounts that “Spanish democracy cannot hold
together unless all parts can think of themselves as incorporating voluntarily in ‘a project’... the
stability of Spain has to be dynamic in nature, not static; it has to emerge from an ongoing,
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mutually respectful project of building a life in common.” On the contrary to creating greater
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national unity, Pettit reasons, any active policy choice besides providing greater regional
autonomy risks further alienating Catalonia from the Spanish federal government.
However, it is important to note that there are still tacit forces tethering autonomous
communities like Catalan within the Spanish federal system. As Pettit notes, “the historical
linkages of the communities, and the benefits derived from the project of incorporation in a
single country— particularly in the view of Spain’s membership in the European Union—
should make the prospect of breakup extremely unlikely. Those benefits are salient enough to
ensure mainstream, democratic support for Spanish affiliation in the more independent of the
57

communities, as opinion polls continue to show.” Importantly, Pettit demonstrates that the
Spanish political system provides Catalonians certain economic and political benefits that they
would not receive if they left Spain, and argues that those benefits would eventually cause many
Catalonians to reconsider secession. If one accepts this argument, Zapatero’s decision to provide
greater autonomy for Catalonia seems to clearly increase the intensity of non-domination for
those in Catalonia without risking balkanization.
Two Key Questions
While Pettit’s republican prescriptions for Spain’s relationship with Catalonia seemed to
have success in the early 2000s, they nonetheless struck me as optimistic and worthy of further
consideration. Indeed, the Catalonia case elicits two important objections that are crucial to
consider as we continue to think about how the state should wrestle with its competing
obligations to various subgroups.
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Does Republicanism Require the Assumption Rational Self-Interest?
Firstly, many could object to Pettit’s analysis that the pressure exerted by the EU on
Catalonia is an effective check on balkanization. Specifically, many could argue that the
effectiveness of such forces assumes a populus free from disinformation that prioritizes
economic considerations above all others. As Pettit himself recognizes, the effectiveness of the
EU’s pressure on Catalonia to remain in Spain relies on the assumptions that Catlonians
prioritize the economic benefits of EU membership above all others, and that they are capable of
recognizing the benefits of EU membership. While ostensibly reasonable, recent trends in
politics and psychology cast significant doubt on those assumptions. Theoretically, Cass
Sunstein’s work on libertarian paternalism demonstrates repeatedly that the manner through
which choices are presented and inertia oftentimes determine one’s behavior.58 Furthermore,
Sunstein’s research demonstrates that individuals are significantly more likely to base their
decisions off of group preferences— indicating that cultural considerations likely also influence
political behavior.59
Indeed, as seen in Britain’s secession from the European Union, citizenries often make
choices that are explicitly not in their rational self-interest in economic terms; rather, they are
often motivated by cultural or alternative considerations as well as misinformation as to what is
in their personal and communal best interests. This could manifest in the cases of post-conflict
zones, where hatred of another party forces both sides to subordinate their economic and political
best interests out of spite. For example, consider Japan’s continued participation in World War II
long after their allies surrendered. Certainly, continuing to fight a lost war that consumed
Richard Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein. 2009. Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness.
New York: Penguin Books.
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significant economic and political resources seems like quintessence of irrationality in economic
terms. On the contrary, Japan’s decision to remain in the war was completely rational when
considering the immense value pride and shame had in Japanese culture. Indeed, it took the
nuclear bombing of two cities and Russia’s commitment to rejoin the war to finally convince
Japan to surrender a losing war that was already against their economic self-interest—
demonstrating that powerful alternative motivations often drive state behavior.
Similarly, irrational behavior and misinformation manifest in the case of Brexit of the
2016 US Presidential election— where rampant misinformation campaigns likely had a
significant impact on the electoral outcomes. Instead of media outlets supporting republican
civicism in discourse, the advent of the information economy economizes on division within
society. As such, even if the region’s membership within a federal or international is in its best
interest, it would be incorrect to assume that that factor alone serves as an adequate constraint on
balkanization.
While some could contend that, regardless of a populus’s capacity for rationality,
democratically reached decisions should be respected— and I am one of them— decisions
dictated by irrational considerations and misinformation can often pose substantive harms in
republican terms for the most vulnerable and are worth further consideration.
Can Republicanism Adequately Consider International Dynamics?
Secondly, many could argue that Pettit’s analysis fails to consider how international
issues can lead to domination. In the Catalonia case many could argue that the economic and
political pressure exerted by the EU, and exploited by Spain, dominates Catalonians.
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Specifically, Pettit argues that pressure from Brussels and its leverage of EU membership
“ensures the continued unity of Spain as a national and international identity.”60 To best see how
the EU accession process exerts pressure on Catalonia which could be exploited by Spain,
consider the processes a seceded Catalonian state would have to take to join the European Union.
According to the EU’s charter, a state that has seceded from an EU member state does not retain
its EU membership— meaning that if Catalonia were to secede, its accession to the organization
would require unanimous approval by EU countries.61 In this case, Pettit notes that “[Spain]
would certainly be disposed to exercise a veto. And, equally certainly, it would be joined by
other nations in doing so,” effectively “banish[ing concerns of Catalonia secession] from
62

previous discussion.” Therefore, despite the fact that nearly all polls indicate overwhelming
support in Catalonia for EU membership, any seceded Catalonian state would be effectively
blocked from accession due to the self-interest of Spain and other EU countries.
In addition to the symbolic cost of overruling the democratic wishes of Catalonians, the
extreme economic and political costs of being barred from the EU makes secession untenable.
Specifically, if Catalonia were to secede without EU membership, those holding Catalonian
passports would lose the right to freedom of movement, goods and services could no longer
move freely to and from Catalonia, and their use of the Euro would “be suspect, like Kosovo
which uses the euro with no legal power to do so; [meaning] there would be no common
agricultural policy money for Catalonia.”63 Given the EU is crucial to Catalonia’s economic and
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political vitality, Spain and the EU’s pressure to keep the seceded state out of the organization
renders secession infeasible. While it certainly could be argued whether or not this sort of
pressure is coercive, Pettit’s unequivocal characterization of that force as legitimate in republican
terms is puzzling. In fact, many could reasonably argue that the spectre of Spain's veto
exemplifies a form of arbitrary control over the newly seceded Catalonian state.
These sorts of problematic dynamics are not unique to Catalonia and appear frequently
when international organizations and foreign actors influence domestic political dynamics.
Indeed, Pettit’s point that member states are generally likely to veto seceded countries accession
to international organizations is a general phenomenon, and one that creates insurmountable
practical constraints that restrict any region’s right to republican self-determination. Certainly, it
would be unfair to characterize the economic and political pressure exerted by the EU and other
international organizations as categorically dominating— Pettit himself notes that any voluntary
association is entitled to have membership requirements and a primary purpose of association is
to provide members benefits. However, it is clear that Spain utilizes the EU’s pressure in a
seemingly dominating fashion to assure against Catalonian self-determination. In response to this
objection, it would be most consistent with his republicanism for Pettit to recognize that the
threat of a veto seen in the Catalonian case is problematic. However, it is unclear to me whether
he would characterize the threat as unequivocally dominating or whether he would view it as an
unfortunate practical constraint that occurs in all international relationships that must be accepted
and worked around. While the former rationale seems most faithful to republicanism— it seems
to render core tenets of republicanism at odds with modern globalism. Regardless of Pettit’s
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potential response, there are two substantive changes that the EU can implement to reduce its
potential for domination of seceded states.
Policy Prescriptions
Firstly, the EU should mandate that the original member state recuse itself from votes on
membership applications of its seceded territories and lower the standard for membership
accession to 4/5. The reasoning for mandating recusal for the original member state is intuitive—
any original member state voting on a seceded territory’s membership application clearly has a
conflict of interest between their own self-interest and that of the body. Given their ability to
effectively veto any accession application, they could railroad otherwise excellent applicants
with impunity and force regions to remain in situations where they are dominated. The decrease
in the standard for approval stems from the same rationale, albeit it is certainly more
controversial. Even without a vote themselves, the original state can still lobby its allies and
bargain with other members of the organization to vote against the seceded states application.
Moreover, many states have a self-interest to veto any accession application to disincentivize
regions within their country from seceding. For these reasons, it seems likely that at least one
member state will still consistently oppose a seceded state’s application regardless of the actual
content of the application. Thus, it is clear that decreasing the standard required to approve a
membership application ensures that the accession process is insulated from such dominating
veto practices and more likely to be guided by the content of each application. While I settled on
4/5, the specific threshold reduction can be reasonably debated: the organization must balance
the benefits a lower threshold has in alleviating this specific dominating relationship present
during secession with the benefits a higher threshold has in preventing EU over-enlargement.
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Secondly, the EU should provisionally provide the same benefits afforded to members to
the seceded state while their application is being evaluated. It is important to note that these
amendments to the voting protocol surrounding EU membership will likely lengthen an already
gradual accession process, which still leaves secede states susceptible to domination in the
interim. While the first reforms surrounding the voting procedure ensure that states will get a
fairer evaluation process, the economic and political impact of being outside the EU during that
transition still works as a powerful incentive against secession. Indeed, imagine if a state had
completely legitimate claims for secession and under this reformed system has a strong change
of accession to the EU. However, as is to be expected with nascent states, their economic and
political institutions initially struggle without the benefits of EU membership. Additionally,
while being unable to veto their membership application, the original member state can seek to
elongate the process as much as possible, forcing the seceded state to endure financial and
political hardship in their pursuit of republican self-determination. Therefore, the EU should
provide the seceded state the benefits of membership to ensure that the transition process is not
exploited by member states to disincentivize secession.
While helpful, the point of this objection is not to illustrate a unique difficulty
republicanism faces in the Catalonian case and offer specific policy prescriptions— rather, it
seeks to demonstrate that international issues require more prominence in republican analyses. In
an increasingly globalized world— relationships with international actors and organizations are
crucial determinants of a state’s viability. As such, they cannot simply be ignored, and must be
considered when conducting traditional republican analyses. Importantly, this reality complicates
the already difficult work republican states do to reconcile their competing obligations. In
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addition to all the domestic obligations outlined in this chapter, the modern state must also both
be wary of international actors dominating their populus, but also cognisant that they hold
obligations to those organizations. However, as I will discuss at the end of this chapter, it is
worth noting that Pettit’s prescriptions for Catalonia were successful despite being primarily
based on a domestic leveled analysis Nonetheless, this objection demonstrates that the manner
through which international considerations complicate traditional republican analyses merits
further analysis.
Pettit’s Response
While these objections highlight general obstacles for Pettit’s republicanism, it is
important to note that they do not significantly undermine his specific prescriptions for the
Catalonian case. Before proceeding, it is important to respond to objections citing Catalonia’s
recent vote to secede as evidence that Pettit’s analysis is problematic. To be sure, as I
demonstrate above, the optimism of his initial analysis would certainly be tempered by further
incorporating international dynamics and reconsidering the assumption that economic concerns
are the primary determinants of political behavior. While I have outlined steps the EU could take
to minimize its domination over Catalonia, it is unlikely that this specific situation would have
been avoided had they been implemented.
Instead, Catalonia’s vote to secede was likely in response to the Spanish government's
attempts to increase centralization at the expense of Catalonian domination— which Pettit
forewarns in his initial analysis. Almost prophetically, Pettit explicitly warns that “the only
danger is that the fear of balkanization, and the associated distrust of communities, may nurture
an aggressive centralism… [such a] confrontational path could prove to be the high road to the
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very balkanization it is supposed to avoid.”64 Upon analyzing the years preceding the 2017
independence vote, it is clear that Spanish politicians should have heeded Pettit’s warning.
Specifically, Catalonia’s independence referendum began in response to the Constitutional Court
of Spain’s 2010 decision to rule that Zapatero’s 2006 Statute of Autonomy, which provided
Catalonia greater self-determination, was unconstitutional.65 While recognizing room for growth
in Pettit’s approach, I am inclined to believe that Pettit’s analysis was sound given it explicitly
forewarned that the government’s decision to revoke regional autonomy would lead to
balkanization. Therefore, we will have to look elsewhere to further explore the ramifications
international dynamics present for republicanism.
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Chapter III: Applying Lessons from Zapatero’s Spain to Kosovo
While Pettit’s framework ultimately proves useful in navigating the Catalonian case, it
remains unclear whether a republican state can successfully navigate its competing obligations in
cases with extensive international involvement and irrational actors. Therefore, this chapter aims
to further examine this ambiguity within Pettit’s republicanism by applying it to the case of
Kosovo. As I will outline below, I selected Kosovo as an alternative case study because it
contains important similarities to the Spanish case which render the comparison appropriate,
while containing unique differences that bring Republicanism’s viability in international cases to
the forefront of the analysis. After establishing Kosovo’s relevance to Pettit’s Catalonian
analysis, this chapter evaluates whether the lessons from Pettit’s analysis of Catalonia are in fact
generalizable to a broad array of international situations. Indeed, this chapter examines whether
Pettit’s conclusions in the Catalonian case are the exception, or the standard, for how republican
states should navigate competing claims of non domination in international cases.
Demonstrating a Basis for Comparison: The Kosovar Context
Before turning to more complex analyses, it is crucial to demonstrate to the reader that
Kosovo’s dynamics are both relevant and applicable comparisons to Pettit’s analysis of
Catalonia. Without establishing the substantial relevance and applicability between the Spain and
Kosovo cases, many could contend that my later analysis is inappropriate. In turn, this chapter
begins by outlining the similarities between Kosovo and Spain in order to develop a strong basis
for engaging Pettit’s theory.
For republican purposes, the primary division in Kosovo’s society is between Kosovo’s
Albanian and Serb populations. To best understand the tensions between the groups, it is

Ciacci, 55
important to provide some historical context. Unlike in the Spanish case where Castillians have
consistently dominated the Spanish federal structure, rule of Kosovo has been consistently
contested by Kosovo’s Albanian and Serb population. This dynamic has led to heightened
tension and animosity between the sides, with the group in power oftentimes persecuting the
minority group. However, Josip Broz Tito’s formation of a Yugoslav national identity in the
mid-20th century largely kept these competing groups in check.66 Interestingly, unlike Franco’s
framing of Spanish culture primarily around Castilian customs, Tito’s vision from Yugoslavia
was pan-slavic which, for a short time, kept peace between the two groups.
Tito’s Death and the War in Kosovo (1980-2000)
Nonetheless, the stability provided by Tito’s governance was unsustainable. Indeed,
Tito’s death in 1980 brought with it the death of the pan-Yugoslav vision that held Kosovo’s
various ethnic groups together. To make matters worse, in the years following Tito’s death the
Serbian government attempted to further establish itself supreme over the other states in the
former Yugoslavia, which further exacerbated ethnic tensions in Kosovo. Unlike the other states
that seceded after Yugoslavia’s dissolution, Kosovo remained a province in Serbia through the
1990s. Importantly, Kosovo was predominantly populated with ethnic Albanian Muslims, which
differed starkly from the rest of Serbia which was Christian Orthadox and Serb. Unfortunately,
these differences heightened tensions between the sides raised the stakes of the political dispute.
More than a simple territorial dispute, the question of Kosovo neatly packaged all the
long-standing resentment and animosity of both groups into a single political crisis. Therefore,
when Kosovo rebelled due to claims that they were being dominated by the Serbian federal
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government, the Serbian federal government responded in-kind, arguing that their historical
occupation of the territory and its importance in Serbian Orthdox Christianity justified its control
over the region.67
These competing claims of domination led to the outbreak of the War in Kosovo in 1999.
The belligerents in the conflict were the Serb-backed Serbian government and Albanian-backed
Kosovo Liberation Army. The war was one of the most violent towards civilians in modern
history, and resulted in over 12,500 fatalities for both sides, over 10,000 missing Kosovar
Albanians, and the displacement of over 90% of the Albanian population in Kosovo.68 While
Kosovar Albanians certainly suffered greater casualties during the conflict, it is important to note
that both sides committed reprehensible acts during the war. Moreover, the International
Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia has convicted both Serbian and Kosovar military
leaders for ethnic cleansing, wartime sexual violence, and the wanton desecration of heritage
sites. These atrocities were likely to continue unabated until NATO initiated a bombing of Serbia
to end the war, making both sides skeptical about the other’s commitment to honoring the
ensuing peace. Indeed, Kosovar Serbs have continued to be victims of organized violence by the
Albanian-majority state after the War’s formal conclusion in June 1999. For example, in the
2004 unrest dubbed by Serbs as “the March Pogrom,” hundreds of Serbs in Northern Mitrovica
were injured and at least 14 were killed in response to fake news articles reporting that a Serb
gang drowned a Muslim Albanian in a local river.69 Therefore, although it may be tempting to
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categorically tilt the legal system to the advantage of one group, Kosovo’s violent history has
manifested in deep distrust between its Serbs and Albanian communities.
Kosovo Independence and Steps Towards Normalization: (2000-Present)
Despite these challenges, the decade since the war’s conclusion has been marked with
notable progress. While Serbia has not formally recognized Kosovo’s independence, the
negotiation of the 2013 Brussels Agreement laid the foundations for integrating Serb majority
regions into the Kosovar Federal Authority.70 Specifically, in exchange for assurances that the
District Court in Northern Kosovo is predominantly administered by Serbs, Serbia agreed to
permit the Kosovo police force to operate in Serb populated areas. Moreover, the Agreement
finally resolved the long-standing disputes surrounding Kosovo’s right to an independent ITU
country code (it previously had to rely on the codes of Monaco, Macedonia, and Serbia).
Moreover, ethnic violence has been steadily decreasing since the 2004 incident. However,
despite Kosovo’s remarkable democratic progress, the conflict’s effects persist subtly today.
Indeed, most Kosovar Serbs and Kosovar Albanians live in geographically isolated communities,
and many of Kosovo’s institutions remain segregated along ethnic lines. Therefore, the
remainder of this chapter aims to apply Pettit’s lessons from the Catalonian case to derive
guidance for the case of Kosovo.
As the above section notes, there are numerous important similarities between the
Kosovo and Spanish cases. While certainly differing in size, the political dynamics in Kosovo
share certain important similarities with the Catalonian case. Like Spain, Kosovo is a fledgling
parliamentary democracy governed by a mixed constitution. Furthermore, as in Spain, tensions
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between competing ethnic, linguistic, and religious sub identities are responsible for a majority
of Kosovo’s current political strife. Similarly to the EU’s role in the Catalonian case,
international organizations and actors play a crucial role in Kosovo’s politics. From the
NATO-led bombing of Serbia to end the war, international engagement has been crucial to
Kosovo's viability since its inception. Indeed, Kosovo relies on international organizations in
administering the rule of law, and the EU’s threats of blocking either side’s accession to the
organization is an important incentive for reconciliation. Therefore, applying Pettit’s analysis of
Catalonia to this dynamic provides us another opportunity to wrestle with republicanism’s
struggles in international cases.
Complicating Pettit’s Catalonian Analysis
The remainder of this chapter applies Pettit’s framework to analyze the reliability of the
rule of law in Kosovo. I decided to focus on the reliability of the rule of law due to its role in
cultivating civility, which is the scarcest republican resource in post-conflict nations like
Kosovo. It is important to recall the importance civility has in republicanism, particularly for
cases like Kosovo. As outlined at the end of Chapter I, norms cultivating civic engagement and
trust in the society’s institutions are crucial in a republican state’s pursuit of equally intense
freedom as non-domination. Moreover, as a prerequisite for passing the republcian eye test,
civility ensures that adequate standards of respect in public debate exist to girdle democratic
deliberation. Practically, civility provides the necessary stability to ensure democratic continuity
in the face of disagreement. It is helpful to recall Pettit’s discussion of contestation in the case of
the Catholic Church in Chapter II, where Pettit argues that parties are more likely to accept a
policy decision they disagree with if “the judgement is made according to their ideas about
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proper procedures and that it is dictated, ultimately, by an interest that they share with others.”71
In post-conflict countries like Kosovo where deep distrust exists between groups and towards
public institutions, strengthening the reliability of the rule of law will create the civility needed to
ensure the democratic continuity seen in the Catholic Church case. Without civility and public
trust in institutions, disagreements on policy questions are more likely to be perceived as acts of
domination by disaffected groups, creating a feedback loop of distrust and violent conflict. For
these reasons, I think it is most pressing to focus on the reliability of the rule of law in Kosovo
given its impact in replenishing the civility required for republican self-government.
The case studies at the heart of my analysis will be the general corruption in Kosovo and
the dysfunction present in Northern Kosovo’s court system. I selected these specific cases
because Pettit addresses analogues at length in his analysis of Zapatero’s Spain, enabling me to
pull from that baseline as I conduct my analysis. Moreover, the structure of this analysis follows
the progression of Chapter II, beginning with a more straight-forward case before turning to a
case where the state must wrestle with competing obligations to numerous groups. In addition to
structural consistency, the rationale for starting with a baseline case to establish republicanism’s
viability in Kosovo strengthens our ability to conduct the latter, more complex, case of the rule
of the law in Northern Kosovo. Therefore, like Chapter II’s case studies, these cases will begin
with a brief situational overview and identify the dominating relationships before turning to
policy prescriptions.
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Case Study #4: Corruption in Kosovo
The first case we will consider is the dominating impact corruption in Kosovo has on its
population. Similarly to the Spanish case, Kosovo’s government is riddled with corruption.
According to a 2013 Report on the Rule of Law in Kosovo, “allegations of corrupt behaviour in
the judiciary continue. The limited independence and impartiality of the judiciary in practice is a
serious impediment to strengthening the rule of law… The Councils and other Kosovo
institutions need to address the reluctance of Kosovo prosecutors and judges to prosecute and try
politically sensitive or high-profile cases against influential defendants.”72 Indeed, it is
commonplace for Kosovars to bribe judges and public officials for preferential treatment in
judicial proceedings. Specifically, Transparency International’s Corruption perception index
73

ranks Kosovo 101 out of 180 countries. Indeed, and perhaps more perniciously, this statistic
demonstrates that the public perceives the judiciary and political system as extremely corrupt
institutions, resulting in very low public confidence in its democratic institutions.
Understanding the Dominating Relationships
The extent of corruption in Kosovo poses significant harms to freedom as
non-domination in two specific ways. Firstly, the existence of corruption permits powerful
groups to dominate others with impunity given the legal system is unreliable. Secondly, the high
perceptions of corruption in the government and judiciary decrease public trust in government
institutions, violating the republican principle of responsiveness. The dangers of both of these
consequences are readily apparent. As seen in the 2014 report on the status of the rule of law in
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Kosovo, those who currently hold political power or did previously during the war are
significantly less likely to be held accountable for their crimes.74 This lack of judicial
accountability prevents disadvantaged groups from seeking recourse through the legal system,
effectively enabling powerful groups to continue dominating others with impunity. Similarly,
widespread corruption demonstrates a failure to uphold the republican principle of
responsiveness, which results in the erosion of public trust and civility. Instead of being
responsive to the interest of the people, the crafting of policy based on the interests of the
powerful further enables the domination of the disadvantaged.
Pettit’s Guidance and Policy Prescriptions
Fortunately, since corruption was also prevalent in Zapatero’s Spain, Pettit’s analysis
provides helpful guidance. Borrowing from the Zapatero administration’s response to corruption,
the Kosovar government could pass legislation similar to the Law of Prevention of Fiscal Fraud
which mandated transparency in land transactions in order to ensure public accountability in
75

property transactions. Similarly, the Kosovar government could create a special intelligence
taskforce dedicated to curbing organized crime, based upon Zapatero’s creation of the Center for
Intelligence against Organized Crime. Finally, according to a European Commission Report,
much of Kosovo’s corruption is concentrated in regional hotbeds and specific municipalities. In
turn, if the aforementioned general strategies fail to curb corruption due to lack of regional or
local cooperation, Zapatero’s Spain provides further guidance to strengthen government
transparency and accountability. Namely, the Kosovar government could dissolve or sanction
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particular townships convicted of malfeasance like the Zapatero administration did to Marbella
after “the mayor and three town counselors were imprisoned on charges of corruption and
76

profiteering.” Together, these policies would likely be helpful in decreasing corruption and
reestablishing public trust in its institutions. Therefore, the initial application of Pettit’s
republicanism to the case of corruption in Kosovo seems successful.
Key Takeaways
Having established that Pettit’s republicanism provides useful guidance in Kosovo, I will
now delve into the more complicated case of the judicial system in Northern Kosovo. After
attempting a simple analysis, it becomes clear that the case of the courts in Northern Kosovo is
more complex given it requires the state to reconcile its competing obligations to various
groups— many of which are international. Following Pettit’s methodology of Spain’s
relationship to Catalonia, I will identify the various groups’ claims of domination before
attempting to apply lessons from Pettit’s earlier analysis. Ultimately, however, Pettit’s analysis
of Catalonia provides insufficient guidance in this case, which merits further reflection.
Case Study #5: Rule of Law in Northern Kosovo
Similarly to those that could critique Pettit’s initial analysis of Spain as being too
simplistic, many could argue that the case of corruption is insulated from the central conflict
between Kosovar Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. In response to this criticism, consider an
alternative case surrounding the rule of law that brings that tension to the forefront of the
analysis: the court system in Northern Kosovo. Importantly, this case is another analogue to the
Spanish case, enabling us to directly draw from Pettit’s analysis.
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Like in Spain, Kosovo’s rule of law suffers from a shortage of judges and other legal
personnel. Specifically, a report by the European Commision declares that “the number of judges
[in Kosovo] is currently insufficient… efforts are needed to finalise the selection process for
77

judges and prosecutors by filling in the remaining vacant positions.” This shortage has resulted
in similar problems seen in Zapatero’s Spain such as significant congestion and delays for court
proceedings. Following the Spanish model, the Kosovar government could increase investment
in the judicial system and create a special judicial office aimed at “streamlining and fast tracking
78

the operation of the courts.” Theoretically, this would mark an important first-step in
strengthening the Kosovar judiciary. Yet, Pettit’s domestic analysis overlooks other crucial
dynamics which cause inefficiencies in Kosovo’s legal system.
Similarly to the Catalonian case, the dysfunction of the court system in Northern Kosovo
is characterized by a variety of interests, many of which are international. According to a 2013
European Commission’s report on the Rule of Law in Kosovo, the judicial system in Northern
Kosovo relies on a complex assortment of domestic and international actors. Specifically, the
report notes that the District Court, the predominant authority in Northern Kosovo, is staffed by
international judges and prosecutors from the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
(EULEX) and is the sole law enforcement mechanism for criminal offenses in the region.
However, the report also notes that parallel Serb municipal courts primarily handle all the civil
cases in the region. Importantly, though, the report notes that “the Serb community in the north
does not accept local judges in the Court[s],” indicating that the Courts sanctioned by the
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Kosovar national authority in the north exist but have little functioning value.79Therefore, unlike
the case of corruption, this case requires that we lay out the competing claims of domination the
various parties have for contesting the judicial institutions in Northern Kosovo before turning to
policy prescriptions.
Understanding the Competing Claims of Non-Domination
This report reveals numerous layers of legal authority with competing republican claims
to jurisdiction in Kosovo’s justice system in Northern Mitrovica. To reiterate, parallel Serbian
courts, the International EULEX Court, and the Kosovar judiciary all have courts in the region.
At a basic level, the existence of three distinct judicial entities with the same purview, but
different republican mandates, poses problems for republicanism’s reliable rule of law constraint.
As courts with courts are bound to contradict upon certain issues, the lack of coordination
between the systems will lead to inconsistencies. Despite these difficulties, each system can be
justified as both dominating for some, and liberating for others, in republican terms. Therefore, it
is crucial to outline the competing claims of domination at the root of each system.
The Regional Approach: Serb Parallel Courts
Firstly, proponents of the parallel Serbian court system could argue that it is required
because the alternative judicial systems dominate Serbs. As seen in the previous case study, it is
documented that Kosovar political institutions, particularly the judiciary, are able to be exploited
to target the disadvantaged. Moreover, according to UNDP official Atdhe Hetemia, polling
consistently reveals that an overwhelming number of Serbs feel unsafe in public, with some polls
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finding that figure to be above 90 percent. Moreover, even if Kosovo’s federal system
administered law impartially, many Kosovar Serbs could nonetheless argue that the system is
arbitrary and dominating. It is worth recalling the final iteration case of Bob, the waiter, from
Chapter I. To briefly summarize, despite not being actively interfered with or threatened at his
current job, Bob is nonetheless dominated due to his experience at a previous restaurant.
Similarly to the case of Bob, the NATO bombing of campaign and persecution of Serbs after the
war could reasonably lead many Serbs to distrust and perceive any alternative court system as
dominating and justifying for a Serb parallel court.
Conversely, many could object to the Serbian parallel court because it has no legal
authority from the Kosovar federal government, making its judicial authority over non-Serbs
arbitrary. Indeed, critics could argue that its existence can be exploited to dominate Kosovar
Albanians. For example, imagine if a Kosovar Albanian from Pristina, the capital, were to be
charged with a crime in Northern Mitrovica, the largest Serb city in Kosovo. Like the claims that
Albanian-dominated courts would yield impartial justice for Serbs, Kosovar Albanians could
reasonably argue the converse. Moreover, even if these Serb courts ruled impartially, opponents
could argue that because this system is legitimated by their government and is inconsistent with
the rest of the polity it is arbitrary. While Serbs in the North may approve of the Serb parallel
court system, those living elsewhere did not consent to its judicial authority— making any
authority it has over them arbitrary.
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The Domestic Approach: Kosovo’s Federal Court System
The dynamics at play in the case of the Kosovar federal court system are largely flipped
around. Importantly, proponents of the Kosovar courts supremacy in Northern Kosovo cite
constitutional legitimacy and the reliability that comes with a uniform legal system. On the other
hand, local Serbs refusal to utilize them renders them practically worthless, but also illuminates
their illegitimacy in republican terms. Indeed, the refusal of Serbs to participate in a judicial
system illustrates that they distrust Kosovar courts’ ability to be impartial and apolitical— a
crucial component of rule of law in a republican society.
The International Approach: EULEX Court System
The final legal system in Northern Kosovo is the EULEX district court. Supporters argue
that the reliance of both the Serb community and the Kosovar government on the EULEX
District Court demonstrate that it is the least dominating option. Indeed, the willingness of both
sides to accept the rulings of the court demonstrates its reliability and legitimacy. Nonetheless,
Kosovar Serbs and Kosovar Albanians alike could claim that the EULEX court’s authority is
dominating given the international organization is democratically illegitimate. Moreover,
republicanism is clear that courts should be composed by a nation’s citizens from a variety of
diverse perspectives. Indeed, if a nation itself cannot establish a rule of law— it can hardly be
considered republican. Therefore, despite its merits, the EULEX court cannot be considered
more than a temporary solution.
To recapitulate: the general ills of this dysfunctional system are two-fold. Firstly, the
operation of three different legal entities with differing claims for republican legitimacy creates
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inconsistencies within the legal system. Secondly, each system has the potential to be exploited
to dominate another group.
Applying Pettit’s Analysis from the Catalonian Case
Fortunately, one could turn to Pettit’s prescriptions for the Catalonian for assistance in
navigating these various dynamics present in Northern Kosovo’s judicial system. Applying the
lessons of the Catalonian case, one could deduce that the dysfunction in Northern Kosovo’s rule
of law is rooted in competing visions of the state’s common interest. Indeed, the conflict in this
case largely stems from Kosovar Serbs and Kosovar Albanians having competing conceptions
about which judicial system best increases their intensity of non-domination. Following Pettit’s
logic in these cases, one could conclude that Kosovo should first recognize the northern Serb
communities’ claim to contest federal policies through conscientious procedural objection and
afford them special privileges to increase their non-domination. If that fails to allay claims of
domination from northern Serb communities, the Kosovar federal government should then
consider how secession in the North would impact other portions of the country. If Pettit’s logic
holds true, those two policies should work to strengthen the non-domination for Serbs in
Northern Kosovo.
And Its Discontents . . .
However, a brief reconsideration of Kosovo’s political and historical context immediately
casts doubt on the effectiveness of Pettit’s prescriptions. Crucially, the Kosovar government has
repeatedly attempted to implement some of Pettit’s solutions, and has made significant efforts to
provide the Serb minority special privileges on the basis of conscientious procedural objection.
As is revealed in the Catalonian case, the presence of members of one’s own subnational identity
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group within political institutions should cultivate civility and trust between those minority
groups and public institutions. Therefore, special provisions within Kosovo’s constitution such
as the requirement that 10% of its legislative seats are reserved for Serbs should increase the
intensity of non-dominations experienced in Serb communities.81 Indeed, if Pettit’s Catalonian
analysis were to hold, these sorts of provisions should result in a more reliable rule of law in
Kosovo. Why, then, has the opposite manifested in Kosovo?
In fact, these efforts to accommodate Serb communities have failed to substantially
improve the intensity of non-domination for Serbs. Despite having reserved representation in
Kosovo’s political institutions, Kosovo’s Serb communities have repeatedly refused to claim
these seats. As seen in the 2013 report on the rule of law in Kosovo, majoirty-Serb regions are
replete with judicial vacancies, oftentimes for seats that are reserved for ethnic Serbs. This
dynamic casts doubt on the effectiveness providing special privileges on the basis of
conscientious procedural objection.
The alternative approach outlined in Pettit’s analysis of Catalonia is for Kosovo to
consider the secession of Northern Kosovo. However, this is undesirable given it would certainly
ignite large-scale conflict. Indeed, recent calls by the Serbian government for the partition of
Northern Kosovo has been met with staunch opposition by Kosovo, the EU, and the United
States, meaning that any secession would almost certainly lead to regional conflict. Even without
the spectre of conflict, succession also faces practical challenges that render it infeasible. As all
the highly populated Serb regions of Northern Kosovo are nested in pockets surrounded by
majority Albanian areas, all potential partitions would have to contain substantial portions of
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Kosovar Albanian territory. Moreover, any land bridge connecting Serbia with Northern
Mitrovica would certainly be rejected by the Kosovar government given it would compromise
their security apparatus. Therefore, Pettit’s primary suggestions from Catalonian fail to provide
guidance in this case.
Having deeming special recognition ineffective and secession unfeasible, this case of
Kosovo’s courts in Northern Mitrovica presents an important challenge for Pettit’s
republicanism: how should a state proceed if both secession and the special privileges afforded
on the basis of conscientious procedural objection fail to increase non-domination for certain
groups in society.
In that vein, it is important to consider why Pettit’s prescriptions seem to fail in the case
of Kosovo. Importantly, I argue that it is because this case is characterized by the two tensions
examined in the Catalonian case: the assumption of rational economic self-interest and the role
of international actors in domestic republican analyses. Firstly, some could argue that Kosovo’s
violent history and its recency complicate traditional considerations. Instead of making choices
in their self-interests, the distrust and resentment between ethnic Serbs and Albanians is an
alternative determinant of decision making not accounted for in rational economic self-interest.
Moreover, the operation of these spite-based politics also make it difficult to cultivate the
republican norms and mores for self-governance. While I think there is some truth to view, and
Pettit himself acknowledges that the development of civility is gradual, Kosovo’s violent history
alone should not render Pettit’s approach ineffective. Indeed, despite Spain’s autonomous
communities being marginalized by the federal government for centuries, they were nonetheless
able to be brought into the fold in Zapatero’s Spain through abiding by republican principles.
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Thus, in addition to this complication, republicanism’s difficulties in analyzing the
Kosovo case also seem to stem from its failure to consider international dynamics. Indeed, this
hypothesis argues that while the cooperation of various extranational stakeholders are required to
establish the rule of law in Kosovo, their involvement also brings negative consequences for the
polity. For example, the Serbian authority has often undermined the attempts of the Kosovar
government to establish rule of law in Serb majority areas. Moreover, despite the best of
intentions, international involvement by the EULEX could evolve to become a parasitic crutch
used by both sides to avoid creating a reliable Kosovar legal system. Indeed, the pressures
exerted by these international actors likely undermine the ability for special recognition to
develop public trust and republican mores in Serbian communities.
Indeed, as demonstrated in the Catalonia case, international dynamics are often crucial in
identifying dominating relationships at the domestic level. In fact, there are certain important
differences between the Kosovo and Spanish cases that increase the importance of international
forces. Specifically, the semi-autonomous regions in Kosovo are not isolated entities like in the
case of Spain. Rather, they are bolstered and operating as arms of the Serbian government.
Consider the corollary argument in the Spanish case— except instead of the Basque country
seeking to become independent, it sought to join the French Basque country and form a
supra-basque state. As a result, the french Basque state would supply the Basque resistance
movement and interfere with Spanish attempts to establish republican infrastructure of
non-domination and cultivate a civic culture. In this instance, it would be irresponsible to craft
policy solutions without considering the international dynamics influencing Spain’s relationship
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with the Basque country. Similarly, the dominating relationships present in Kosovo cannot be
fully understood through a domestic-styled republican analysis.
Rehabilitating Pettit’s Analysis: Adapting Republicanism to International Issues
Indeed, solutions to the case of Kosovo are both international and domestic. Moreover,
until republican mores have had sufficient time to flourish in Kosovo, the various stakeholders
must cooperate to ensure that republican principles can be abided by until that moment. Thus,
Pettit’s framework must be rehabilitated to ensure it can harness the competing obligations of the
various stakeholders present to create a solution.
Clarifying the State’s Republican Obligations
Before considering what specific steps these competing stakeholders could take in
strengthening Kosovar democratization, its important to clearly delineate the different bases that
the domestic and international actors have in contesting the federal government's policy choices.
Thus, the following subsections will demonstrate the republican obligations parties have at the
domestic and international level and identify their analogue in the case of Kosovo.
Domestic Claims to Contestation
In this reconceptualized framework, the first groups that can contest private or public
domination are domestic organizations. As demonstrated in Chapter II, both private and public
groups can make legitimate republican claims against domination at the domestic level. It is
helpful to recall the Catholic Church, ETA, and Catalonia cases that were discussed in Chapter
II, as they provide a blueprint for how a state should handle cases where it must balance
competing claims of domination made by domestic groups. To summarize, in these cases, the
state evaluates claims based upon their republican basis, and determines policy responses based
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upon their potential impact upon society’s intensity of non-domination. To provide an example
in the case of Kosovo: the two groups that draw their bases for contestation from this subsection
are its ethnic Albanian and Serb populations.
International Claims to Contestation
In addition to domestic considerations, international actors also play a crucial role in
Kosovo’s democratization and require further analysis. While Pettit’s framework largely refrains
from providing specific guidance for how republican states should handle international cases, we
can nonetheless derive guidelines for international engagement from republicanism’s core
principles. Indeed, many of republicanism’s expectations for citizens at the domestic level
translate well for states in the international arena. In turn, this subsection distinguishes the
different republican bases international organizations have in intervening in another state’s
domestic politics.
International Organizations
The first types of international actors present in the case of Kosovo are international
organizations. Pettit outlines that international organizations' primary republican obligations are
to support the democratization of illiberal regimes and ensure that freedom as non-domination
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exists between states. However, the manner through which international organizations pursue
these goals is largely unclear. As has been demonstrated in both Spain and Kosovo, the
interference of international institutions in local issues has the potential to both liberate or
dominate a country’s citizens. Therefore, it is important to clarify when an international
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organization has a republcian basis for interfering with a state’s domestic affairs in pursuit of its
republican obligations.
Importantly, as Chapter II’s analysis of Catalonia demonstrates, it is acceptable for
international organizations to apply economic and political pressure on member states in certain
circumstances. Borrowing from Pettit’s domestic analysis, interference by an international
organization is “legitimate to the extent that it is subjected to the effective, equally shared control
of its members.”83 This type of institutional legitimacy is seen in the capital control mechanisms
present in Eurozone countries. In exchange for receiving the benefits of being in the Eurozone,
individual countries forfeit certain fiscal policy decisions to the EU. While any state within the
question sacrifices certain fiscal authorities to the EU, the EU’s interference is non-arbitrary
because the state grants this authority to the body as a condition for its membership. Similarly to
how the government is permitted to imprison murderers to protect its citizens, international
organizations can justify certain invasive policies in republican terms if it is approved of by the
relevant populus.
Importantly, though, instances international organizations can intervene are strictly
defined and constantly reviewed. While international organizations can exert pressure over their
member states, states have the right to contest their behavior within the structures of the
institution, and reserve the right to leave the union if they determine that the relationship is
inequitable. Thus, despite having a legitimate republican basis for involvement in member states,
international organization’s claims for intervention are still ultimately secondary to the
considerations of national governments.
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Foreign States
The final category of international actors present in the Kosovo case are foreign
governments. Theoretically speaking, foreign governments are generally more constrained than
international institutions given they have no republican authority over other states. Even if a
foreign government were to enter a domestic situation at the behest of the local population—
there is no mechanism to ensure that the foreign government does not overstay their mandate
with impunity. As demonstrated by United States foreign policy in the Middle East, third-party
interventions, even if initially successful, often have long-term destabilizing effects. Indeed, as
foreign governments are not accountable to the relevant populus, their interference is driven by
their domestic political considerations— oftentimes leading to the domination of relevant
populations.
Foreign States with Legitimate Republcian Claims
However, it is important to make a clear distinction between a foreign state that is a
third-party actor, and a foreign state that has a legitimate republican link to a state. This
distinction is most clearly seen in the competing claims that the US and Serbia could make for
engagement in Kosovo. Despite the debatable benefits US intervention would provide Kosovo,
the US has little republican justification for involving itself in another sovereign nation’s affairs
in republican terms. Conversely, the Serbian government can reasonably cite the domination of
Serbian citizens in Kosovo as the basis for contesting Kosovar governmental policy. Moreover,
Serbia could make the claim that the broader Serb ethnic community in Kosovo further justify
Serbian involvement. While Serbia’s legitimate republican interest certainly supersedes one that
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is leveraged by a third-party, they both ultimately must respect the ultimate authority of the
Kosovar state.
Importantly, for foreign states and international organizations, the means and forum for
contesting a government’s policy choices are unclear. Although Pettit himself does not clearly
delineate the processes, I think there are a few assumptions one could draw from his domestic
framework and discussion of international obligations. Specifically, there should be a higher bar
for intervention and deference toward domestic governments as they ought to be best positioned
to listen to the claims of the people and change should ideally be generated within the state.
When states and international organizations determine that international action is necessary, the
action should be approved by its domestic populace in the form of a UN verified referendum,
and an impartial UN commision should evaluate the validity of the state’s republican basis for
the intervention after the fact to prevent wanton escalations.
Concrete Policy Recommendations for All Parties
As demonstrated in the previous section, a coordinated effort between these various
actors is required to strengthen the rule of law in Northern Kosovo. Here are a few steps the
various stakeholders could take in order to strengthen the intensity of non-domination for
Kosovo’s citizens.
The Kosovar Federal Government
While the Kosovar federal government has the greatest basis for interfering with the
citizens of Kosovo, it nonetheless has the obligation to reduce the court system’s domination of
Kosovar Serbs. In turn, despite the positive steps taken to provide special privileges for ethnic
Serbs, the government should make government and legal documents available in Serbian. The
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accessibility of government documents in Serbian would increase the trust Serb communities
have in public institutions and increase their access to comprehensible legal documents, work,
consumer rights, health protection, education and social services— all important resources
required to resist public and private domination.
While linguistic accessibility is an important step towards fostering trust between the
sides, further action by the Kosovar government is needed to reassure Serbs that they will be
treated equitably in Kosovo’s judicial system. Indeed, an important first step would be for
Kosovar Serbs to allow the security of Serb dominated areas to be administered by both groups
and strengthen Serbs’s trust in Kosovo’s legal system.
The Serbian Federal Government
As seen in the competing claims of domination subsection, many Kosovar Albanians
reasonably argue that the existence of parallel Serb courts impede Kosovo’s democratization and
dominate non-Serbs. While it is understandable that Serbia desires equitable legal protection for
Serbs and is entitled to advocate for them, creating a parallel court system undermines the
domestic legitimacy of Kosovo’s federal court system and creates inconsistencies in the legal
system that harms all Kosovars. Therefore, the Serbian government needs to refrain from
undermining Kosovar rule of law and supporting parallel legal structures in Northern Kosovo.
Instead, Serbia should build upon the 2013 Brussels agreement which reserves judicial
seats in Northern Kosovo for Kosovar Serbs, and leverage its influence in majority Serb
communities to legitimize Kosovo’s legal system. An important first step in this direction would
be for the Serbian parliament to formally pass the 2013 Brussels Agreement. Despite its
immense political value, the agreement contains no legal authority without being passed by the
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Serbian parliament. The status of the agreement enables Serbia to claim to international
organizations that they are committed to the reconciliation process, whilst also signalling to
Serbs in Kosovo that the document is no more than a formality. Passing the agreement would
demonstrate their broader commitment to the reconciliation process and illustrate to Kosovar
Serbs that the agreement is a serious step towards more equitable legal treatment.
Secondly, Serbia needs to allow Kosovars living in Serbia to freely vote absentee. As it
stands, there are widespread reports that the Serbian government rigs absentee ballots in favor of
pro-Serbia parties in Kosovo. These practices undermine the integrity of Kosovo's democratic
process, but also exacerbate the disconnect between Kosovo’s federal government and its Serb
population. Indeed, supplanting the genuine sentiments of Kosovar Serbs living abroad for the
political positions of the Serbian government will render Kosovo’s government unable to assess
the real preferences of Kosovar Serbs and will further polarize the issue and prevent the growth
of republican civility. In addition to increasing the intensity of non-domination for Kosovar
Albanians, these steps ensure that above efforts taken by the Kosovar government are effective
in reducing the domination of ethnic Serbs in Kosovo.
The EU and Other International Organizations
Broadly, international organizations should ensure that both sides follow through with the
above policy changes. As the administration of the rule of law in Northern Kosovo dominates
both Kosovar Serbs and Kosovar Albanians, international organizations have the obligation to
support Kosovo’s citizens to be free from domination. In that vein, the EU should pressure
Serbia to formally ratify the 2013 Brussels agreement and continue predicating EU accession for
either nation on commitment to resolving the dispute. Importantly, this sort of pressure is not
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dominating given the EU is entitled to establishing certain membership requirements for
accession. As neither side is a member of the organization, they are not entitled to its benefits
unless they are willing to meet its membership standards. Moreover, unlike the Catalonian case,
the exertion of this pressure will be uniform to both Serbs and Albanians, making it unable to be
utilized by one party to dominate the other.
Further, until these aforementioned efforts are effective, the EULEX and other
international organizations should continue to operate in Northern Kosovo. Unlike previous
prescriptions, this recommendation is problematic in republican terms. Indeed, I concede that
extending the EULEX court’s mandate will likely dominate Kosovar Serbs. Despite their
reliance on the system, many likely still perceive it as a form of arbitrary control. Nonetheless, it
is the only court system that both the ethnic Serbs and the federal government recognize. Thus,
while imperfect, the EULEX is the only actor presently capable of establishing a rule of law
capable of stabilizing the situation until Kosovo is eventually able to reassume control of the
judicial system. Together, the cooperation of Serbia, Kosovo, and the EU on these fronts should
hopefully stabilize Kosovo’s politics until a unified civic culture is created and the country is
capable of self-governance.
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Conclusion: International Paternalism as a Barrier to Freedom as Non-domination
The necessity of EULEX involvement in cultivating republican rule of law in Kosovo
revives concerns surrounding the viability of Pettit's framework in international cases. In turn,
the remainder of this paper will address this tension and conclude by assessing its implications
on the viability of Pettit’s republicanism in the modern world. While EULEX should continue to
operate until the Kosovar court system can reestablish itself, the lack of clarity in the court’s
mandate nonetheless poses significant problems for the long-term viability of republican rule of
law in Kosovo. As I discussed earlier in Chapter III, Kosovo’s reliance on international justice
delegitimizes its capacity for self-governance and weakens public trust in its institutions. Indeed,
many could claim that EULEX’s central role in establishing the rule of law empowers an
unaccountable actor with the polity’s most crucial functions— seemingly in contradiction with
the core republican value of self-governance. Defenders of Pettit’s view could respond to these
concerns by arguing that EULEX’s presence constitutes a non-arbitrary form of interference that
is reconcilable with Pettit’s framework. Citing the Ulysses case discussed in Chapter I, they
could argue that the EULEX court is ultimately accountable to and responsive to the Kosovar
state, and therefore legitimate in republican terms. However, two crucial constraints must be
present for the EULEX case to truly mirror the Ulysses case.
Firstly, interference by a third-party is only non-arbitrary if it has the consent of the
person being interfered with. At the international level, as noted at the end of Chapter III,
international interference is only legitimate if it is administered and actively consented to by the
domestic population. While some defenders of Pettit’s view could argue that Kosovo’s
population retains republican legitimacy, the evidence is largely to the contrary. According to a
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survey conducted by the National Endowment of Democracy, 54% of Kosovar respondents
stated they do not trust the institution.84 Importantly, this source surveyed both Kosovar Serbs
and Albanians— demonstrating that both groups with claims to domination are unsatisfied with
the EULEX.  Domestic political sentiments mirror these sentiments. Indeed, according to Albin
Kurti, the leader of the leftwing opposition Vetevendosje party, many Kosovars feel that the “the
international community has very low ambitions for us, and is focused on short-term political
stability and crisis management."

85

Secondly, for interference to qualify as non-dominating it must be temporary, and with a
specific and limited purview. Even in the Ulysses case, his crewmate’s authority to restrain him
was temporary, and was only limited to that specific encounter with the Sirens. Thus, for the
EU’s interference to qualify as a corollary for the Ulysses case, its authority must be temporary
and restricted. At first glance, EULEX largely is faithful to this constraint, as the court’s mandate
is set to expire in 2020 and its authority is limited to Northern Kosovo. Yet, it seems more likely
that the international interference present in the case of Kosovo is dominating. Indeed, if one
takes a step back, one realizes that international actors have interfered in Kosovo’s affairs
broadly for the past 20 years. Despite the end of EULEX’s mandate, many other international
organizations are operating in perpetuity in Kosovo, and surely, all of them cannot be faithful
corollaries for the Ulysses case, casting doubt on this dynamics reconcilability with a republican
approach.
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The alternative, then, is that Pettit’s republicanism faces a fundamental difficulty in
applying to international issues. From the outset, Republicanism struggled to provide clear
guidance for how states should manage its competing republican obligations to different actors.
This realization first occurred in Pettit’s analysis of Catalonia, and was further confirmed by the
complications present in the case of Kosovo. Indeed, the need for paternalism in the case of
Kosovo casts doubt on the achievability of freedom as non-domination in a globalized world. In
addition to the foreign states, relevant third-parties, and international organizations discussed
here, it is likely that other entities whose influence transcend borders such as multinational
corporations, social media conglomerates, and non-state actors will further complicate the
applicability of Pettit’s framework.
Perhaps in 1860 Pettit’s domestic approach could avoid these sorts of complications, as
international actors were nowhere near as ubiquitous as they are today. But in a globalized
world— it is no longer viable for political philosophies to relegate themselves away from
international considerations. Indeed, the computers we use, the clothes we wear, and the cars we
drive are the products of supply chains spanning the corners of the globe. And of particular
concern for Pettit and other republicans, the transmission of these goods and services will bring
with them novel types of dominating relationships. Yet, Kosovo’s reliance on arbitrary
international interference to cultivate freedom as non-domination illustrates the difficulties such
approach has in international issues. Unless it is clarified how republicanism can adapt to these
circumstances— I am left doubtful of its ability to rise to the challenge.
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